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1. Introduction1
The view that inflation targeting (IT) is a robust monetary policy framework was shaken2
by the global financial crisis in 2007-8 resulting in policy interest rates stuck near zero levels3
for a very long time in the US and Europe. An earlier crisis in Japan had led to very4
low rates since the mid 1990s. This so-called zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint for policy5
interest rates has raised calls from prominent central bankers to reform the monetary policy6
framework. Price level targeting (PLT) has been suggested as a more appropriate framework7
for monetary policy than IT. Evans (2012) discusses how PLT provides additional guidance8
and can be used to combat the liquidity trap and Carney (2012) remarks that with policy9
rates at ZLB “there could be a more favorable case for nominal GDP targeting” (nominal10
GDP targeting is related to PLT).11
More recently, Williams (2017), President of the FRB of New York and Bernanke (2017),12
former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, have come out forcefully in support of flexible13
PLT. While Williams suggests that flexible PLT would be a good monetary policy framework14
in a world with a low natural rate of interest, Bernanke recommends it as the best policy in15
times when short term interest rates are near zero. Bernanke advocates temporary PLT as16
an alternative framework for monetary policy (and against a higher inflation target under17
IT). Bullard (2018) and Bostic (2018), Presidents of the FRB of Saint Louis and Atlanta18
respectively, suggest PLT should be studied further.19
Despite the strong advocacy, there is in fact very little actual experience with PLT.20
Historically, the closest example to our knowledge is Sweden which in the 1930s practiced21
monetary policy akin to PLT for about two years; see Jonung (1979) and Berg and Jonung22
(1999) for a detailed study. This probably explains why PLT analysis has been mostly23
confined to the academic literature, which has typically relied on the rational expectations24
(RE) hypothesis. This paper relaxes the RE assumption and analyzes PLT as a monetary25
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policy framework under imperfect knowledge and compares it to IT. Our perspective is in1
line with the recent comprehensive survey paper on monetary policy by Eusepi and Preston2
(2018).3
The key novelty in this paper is that performance of PLT is assessed in the presence4
of endogenously evolving credibility of PLT monetary policy, taking into account the5
self-referential feature of the model. The evolution of credibility is formally modeled as6
reinforcement learning on the part of agents. The main question is whether introduction7
of PLT in the presence of ZLB and sluggish economic activity can induce the economy to8
escape from the recession scenario towards the desired steady state.9
The analysis is conducted in a non-linear micro-founded New Keynesian (NK) model10
where the ZLB on interest rates is explicitly taken into account. The PLT regime, like IT, is11
subject to global indeterminacy problems as the ZLB creates two steady states, the targeted12
steady state and a low-inflation (“liquidity trap”) steady state at which the policy interest13
rate is at the ZLB. This paper elucidates circumstances conducive to a successful escape from14
the ZLB regime by focusing on diﬀerent possibilities in the announced aspects of PLT and its15
evolving credibility. To obtain the results and intuition as stark as possible the NK model is16
kept simple in other respects e.g. by ignoring financial market frictions. One interpretation17
of the analysis is that financial frictions leading to appearance of a credit spread have caused18
the economy to be stuck in a deflationary (low inflationary) scenario.119
Interestingly, the dynamics of a calibrated version of the model fits the Swedish experience20
with price stabilization in the 1930s. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to make21
theoretical arguments for PLT that accord with the Swedish experience.22
Dynamic performance of learning in the PLT regime strongly depends on nature of com-23
munication about the target price path in PLT and the degree of credibility of the regime.24
1A positive credit spread due to financial frictions can imply a positive lower bound on market rates, see
eg. Curdia and Woodford (2010). Even slightly negative policy rates have been seen recently. For brevity,
we do not consider these possibilities.
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A basic issue in a move from IT to PLT is whether a future target path for the price level1
should be announced. If the target path is made known, the significance of additional guid-2
ance about the future depends on how much weight this information has in the agents’3
forecasts for inflation. Private agents can combine inflation forecasts based on knowledge4
about the target price path with forecasts based purely on inflation data. The weight of the5
former forecasts relative to the latter measures credibility of PLT in our case. Credibility is6
assumed to evolve endogenously over time depending on the relative performance measure.7
Robustness of monetary policy regimes is assessed by comparing the sizes of the domain8
of attraction of the targeted steady state under learning for each policy regime.2 A large9
domain of attraction means that the economy will eventually get back to the target even10
after a large shock. An initial condition away from the targeted steady state may represent a11
shock to the economy. Domains of attraction have been computed for a given policy regime12
in the literature, but to our knowledge its size for diﬀerent regimes has not been used as a13
desideratum.14
The plan of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the basic model and the15
equilibrium equations with learning. Section 4 considers the case when the target price level16
path is not communicated under PLT. Section 5 analyzes the case of full credibility of PLT.17
The main focus is on imperfect initial credibility of a newly introduced PLT policy which18
is studied in Section 6. In Section 7 it is shown that a calibrated version of the model19
can match the experience of Sweden in overcoming deflation during the 1930’s episode.20
Sensitivity analysis for diﬀerent calibrations of model parameters is also done here. Section21
8 concludes. The Online Appendix discusses the literature, intuitions, various technical22
details, and further aspects of the model dynamics. The beginning of the Appendix lists its23
sections and the material in them.24
2Formally, the domain of attraction is the set of all initial conditions from which learning dynamics
converge to the steady state.
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2. A New Keynesian Model1
A standard New Keynesian model is employed as the analytical framework (see e.g.2
Benhabib, Evans, and Honkapohja (2014)) but the cashless limit is adopted for simplicity.3
Many technical details and discussions of the literature are in Online Appendices to this4
paper.5
There is a continuum of household-firms that produce a diﬀerentiated consumption good6
under monopolistic competition and price-adjustment costs. There is a government that uses7
monetary policy, buys a fixed amount of output and finances spending by taxes and issues8
of public debt.39
The objective for agent  is to maximize expected, discounted isoelastic cum quadratic
utility subject to a standard flow budget constraint (in real terms) over the infinite horizon:
 0
∞X
=0

" 1−
1−  −
1+
1 +  −

2
µ 
−1 − 1
¶2#
(1)
  +  +Υ = −1−1 −1 +   (2)
where  is the consumption aggregator,  is the labor input into production, and 10
denotes the real quantity of risk-free one-period nominal bonds held by the agent at the11
end of period . Υ is the lump-sum tax collected by the government, −1 is the nominal12
interest rate factor between periods − 1 and ,  is the price of consumption good , 13
is output of good ,  is the aggregate price level, and the inflation rate is  = −1.14
The subjective discount factor is denoted by . The parameters     015
The final term parameterizes the cost of adjusting prices in the spirit of Rotemberg16
(1982). The Rotemberg formulation is used rather than the Calvo model of price stickiness17
because it enables us to study global dynamics in the nonlinear system. The household18
decision problem is also subject to the usual “no Ponzi game” (NPG) condition. In (1) the19
3Monetary policy is conducted in terms of a interest rate rule and consumers are assumed to be Ricardian.
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expectations 0() are in general subjective and may not be rational. This approach is1
called anticipated utility maximization over the infinite horizon (IH).2
Production function for good  is standard  = where 0    1. There is no3
capital. Output is diﬀerentiated and firms operate under monopolistic competition. Each4
firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve5
 =
µ

¶−1
 (3)
6
Here  is the profit maximizing price set by firm  consistent with its production . The7
parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between two goods and is assumed to be greater8
than one.  is aggregate output, which is exogenous to the firm.9
The market clearing condition is  +  = . The government consumes amount  of10
the aggregate good, collects the real lump-sum tax Υ from each consumer and issues bonds11
 to cover financing needs. Fiscal policy is assumed to follow a linear tax rule for lump-sum12
taxes Υ = 0+−1, where −1− 1    1, so fiscal policy is “passive” in Leeper’s (1991)13
terminology. Government purchases  is taken to be stochastic, so that  = ¯ + ˜ where14
the random part ˜ is an observable exogenous AR process15
˜ = ˜−1 +  (4)16
with zero mean. 417
2.1. The Phillips Curve and the Consumption Function18
To determine the infinite-horizon (nonlinear) Phillips curve, the following assumptions19
are made for reasons of simplicity (see Benhabib, Evans, and Honkapohja (2014) for further20
details). It is assumed that agents have identical utility and production functions. Initial21
debt holding and prices are also assumed to be identical. In addition, it is assumed that22
4For simplicity, it is assumed  is known (if not it could be estimated during learning). Only one shock
is introduced in order to have a simple exposition of the basics of least squares learning and endogenous
dynamics. No attempt is made to obtain a good fit using a variety of random shocks. For the latter see e.g.
Amano and Shukayev (2012).
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(i) agents have homogenous point expectations and (ii) have learnt the per capita market1
clearing equation from past experience. In this representative agent economy temporary2
equilibrium in current period  has the property  =  for all product varieties. As3
harmless simplification it is assumed that  + =  + for expectations.4
It can be shown that the Phillips curve takes the form
 = ˜( +1 +2) ≡ 
(1+)
 −  − 1

( − (¯ + ˜)) + (5)


∞X
=1
−1 ¡+¢(1+) −  − 1
∞X
=1
 
+
(+ − (¯ +  ˜)) 
where the notation  = ( − 1) is used. Expectations in (5) are formed at time  and5
based on parameter estimates that use information about endogenous variables at the end6
of period − 1. Actual variables and the observable exogenous random shock at time  are7
assumed to be known when agents make current decisions. Equation (5) is treated as one of8
temporary equilibrium equations that determine  given expectations {+}∞=1.59
To derive the consumption function it is assumed that consumers are Ricardian in the10
sense that they amalgamate their own intertemporal budget constraint and that of the11
governments (where the latter is evaluated at price expectations of the consumer). It can be12
shown the consumption function takes the form13

∞X
=1
(+)(1−) =
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+ − (¯ +  ˜)) (6)
14
where the discount factor is15
+ = +1
Y
=2
+−1
+  (7)16
In practice central banks do not make their policy instrument rules known; thus we assume17
agents do not know the interest rule or even its functional form (this is often called the18
5Note that expected future aggregate inflation rate does not directly aﬀect current inflation but there
is an indirect eﬀect via current output in the Phillip’s curve (5). Using (3) in the first-order conditions to
eliminate relative prices and the representative agent assumption, each firm’s output equals average output
in every period. Since firms can be assumed to have learned this to be the case, we obtain (5).
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non-transparent case). This is reflected in (7) by private agents forming expectations about1
future interest rates.62
2.2. Monetary Policy Frameworks3
2.2.1. Inflation targeting (IT)4
For simplicity of comparison, IT is modeled using the standard Taylor rule that is5
piecewise linear6
 = 1 +max[¯− 1 + ( − ∗) + [( − ∗)∗] 0] (8)7
where ¯ = −1∗ is the gross interest rate at the target and the ZLB is introduced, so that8
the gross interest rate cannot fall below one. Target output ∗ is the steady state value9
associated with ∗. The inflation target ∗ for the medium-long run is assumed to be known10
to private agents but agents do not know the rule (8).11
2.2.2. Price-level targeting (PLT)12
A simple formulation is considered, where (i) the policy maker sets an exogenous target13
path for the price level {¯} as a medium to long run target and (ii) sets the policy instrument14
with the intention to move the actual price level gradually toward a targeted price level path.15
The target path {¯} is assumed to involve constant inflation, so that16
¯¯−1 = ∗ ≥ 1 (9)17
The interest rate is set according to theWicksellian rule18
 = 1 +max[¯− 1 + [( − ¯)¯] + [( − ∗)∗] 0] (10)19
where the max operation takes account of the ZLB. To have comparability to the IT rule20
(8), a piecewise linear formulation and the same level for target inflation are adopted. Rules21
6The implications of transparency are available in earlier versions of this paper.
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like (10) are called Wicksellian, see pp. 260-61 of Woodford (2003) and Giannoni (2014).71
Here the interest rate is set above (below) the targeted steady-state value of the instrument2
when the actual price level is above (below) the targeted price-level path ¯, measured in3
percentage deviations. A response to the percentage gap between targeted and actual levels4
of output is also allowed. This formulation could be called flexible price-level targeting.5
In the PLT regime the policy maker may or may not announce the target path {¯} for6
the price level. (i) The case of PLT with opacity arises if {¯} is not made known to7
the private agents. In this case agents continue to forecast inflation using only past data on8
inflation (and other observable variables).8 (ii) The target path {¯} is announced to agents.9
There is full credibility if agents make full use of the announced target price level path in10
inflation forecasting and place no weight on pure statistical forecasting from inflation data11
(details are discussed below).12
The general case is imperfect credibility, where private agents are assumed to form13
their inflation forecasts as a weighted average of the forecasts based on preceding cases of14
(i) and (ii) above. Use of the relative weights of the two forecasting methods measures the15
degree of credibility and modeling this evolution of limited credibility as endogenous over16
time are the crucial elements in our analysis.17
3. Learning and Temporary Equilibrium18
In adaptive learning it is assumed that each agent has a model for perceived dynamics19
of state variables, also called the perceived law of motion (PLM), to make their forecasts.20
In any period the PLM parameters are estimated by recursive least squares using available21
data and the estimated model is used for forecasting. The PLM parameters are re-estimated22
7PLT is sometimes advocated as a way to achieve optimal policy with timeless perspective under RE
locally near the targeted steady state. The learnability properties then depend on the implementation of
the corresponding interest rate rule. See Evans and Honkapohja (2013), section 2.5.2 for an overview and
further references.
8This assumption is plausible as lacking any prior experience of PLT, agents might forecast inflation the
same way they did under IT.
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when new data becomes available in the next period. A common formulation is to postulate1
that the PLM is a linear regression model where endogenous variables depend on intercepts,2
observed exogenous variables and (possibly) lags of endogenous variables. Then estimation3
would be based on least squares or related methods.94
In the current model agents’ learning is about how to forecast future inflation, output5
and interest rate. The model is purely forward-looking while the observable exogenous shock6
˜ is an AR(1) process. Then the appropriate PLM is a linear projection of (+1 +1 +1)7
onto an intercept and the exogenous shock and agents estimate the regressions8
 =  + ˜−1 +  (11)9
where  = , ,  by using a version of least squares and data for periods  = 1   − 1.10
The latter is a common timing assumption in the learning literature; at the end of period11
− 1 the parameters are estimated using data through to period − 1. This gives estimates12
−1, −1, −1, −1, −1, −1 and using these estimates and data at time  the13
forecasts are given by14
+ = −1 + −1 ˜ (12)15
for future periods  + . These forecasts are then substituted into the system to determine16
a temporary equilibrium of the economy in periods  + . With the new data point the17
estimates are updated and the process continues.18
It turns out that the technical analysis of convergence and computation of domains of19
attraction can be carried out using a simplification. The model is purely forward-looking20
while ˜ is an AR(1) process. Then the appropriate PLM is a linear projection of the21
state variables (+1 +1 +1) onto an intercept and the exogenous shock and in this case22
convergence of learning to a fixed point is fully governed by the dynamics of intercepts.23
Thus, domains of attraction can be validly computed by assuming ˜ is identically zero. The24
9Online Appendix B discusses the setting more, including references to the learning literature.
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agents are then thought to estimate the mean values of state variables, called “steady state1
learning”, and is used here as a technical tool. It is emphasized that in simulations of the2
full model agents do least squares learning.3
Steady state learning with point expectations is formalized as4
+ =  for all  ≥ 1 and  = −1 + (−1 − −1) (13)5
It should be noted that in this notation expectations  refer to future periods (and not the6
current one). When forming  the newest available data point is −1, i.e. expectations are7
formed in the beginning of the current period. This paper assumes ‘constant gain’ learning,8
so that the gain parameter  = , for 0   ≤ 1 and assumed to be small.9
The temporary equilibrium equations of the model with steady-state learning are:1010
(i) the aggregate demand function which is obtained by combining the consumption function11
(6) with the market clearing condition,  +  = 12
 =  (      ) (14)13
(ii) the nonlinear Phillips curve which is obtained by combining the inverse function of14
 = ( − 1) and (5)15
 = Π(  )] (15)16
These are coupled with the interest rate rule (10) under PLT (or (8) under IT.With Ricardian17
consumers, we note that the dynamics for assets do not influence the dynamics of inflation,18
output and the interest rate.19
4. Expectation Dynamics20
4.1. Steady States and Stability21
A non-stochastic steady state ( ) under PLT must satisfy the Fisher equation  =
−1, the interest rate rule (10), and steady-state form of the equations for output and
10The explicit expressions are given in Online Appendix C.
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inflation (14) and (15). One steady state clearly obtains when the actual inflation rate
equals the inflation rate of the price-level target path, see equation (9). Then  = ¯,  = ∗
and  = ∗, where ∗ is the unique solution to the equation
∗ = Π( (∗ ∗ ¯ ¯) ∗)]
Moreover, for this steady state  = ¯ for all .1
The targeted steady state under the PLT rule is, however, not unique. Intuitively, the2
Fisher equation  = −1 is a key equation for a nonstochastic steady state and ¯ ∗3
satisfies the equation. If policy sets  = 1, then ˆ =   1 becomes a second steady state as4
the Fisher equation also holds when the ZLB condition is binding:11 Moreover the targeted5
steady state is locally determinate while the second steady state is locally indeterminate.6
Remark 1 (i) If −1∗ − 1  , there exists a ZLB-constrained steady state under the7
Wicksellian PLT rule (10) in addition to the target steady state. The ZLB-constrained steady8
state satisfies ˆ = 1, ˆ = , where ˆ solves the equation ˆ = Π( (ˆ ˆ 1 1) ˆ).9
(ii) The target steady state is locally determinate if   0 and  ≥ 0. The second steady10
state is locally indeterminate.11
Next we summarize the stability results for steady states in the IT and PLT regimes12
when future expectations are formed using steady state learning. Consider PLT with opacity.13
Expectations of output, inflation and the interest rate influence their behavior as is evident14
from equations (14) and (15). Expectations are given by equations (13) for variables  =15
 . The stability results are:16
Remark 2 (i) IT: The targeted steady state is expectationally stable if   −1, provided17
 is not too large.12 The ZLB-constrained steady state is not expectationally stable.18
11In what follows ˆ = 1 is taken as a steady state equilibrium. In principle, we then need to impose a
finite satiation level in money demand or assume that the lower bound is slightly above one, say ˆ = 1+ .
The latter assumption is used below in the numerical analysis.
12This is a version of the Taylor principle. The seminal paper is Bullard and Mitra (2002).
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(ii) PLT under opacity: If   0 the target steady state is expectationally stable, provided1
 is not too large. The ZLB-constrained steady state is not expectationally stable.2
4.2. Robustness of Policy with Opacity3
Performance of IT and PLT regimes with opacity are now compared using the domains4
of attraction of the targeted steady state. This situation could happen if after a shift from5
IT to PLT agents stick with their earlier forecasting practice or because the target path is6
not made known.7
The calibration adopted for a quarterly framework is ∗ = 1005,  = 099,  = 07,8
 = 12821,  = 21,  =  = 1, and  = 02. The targeted steady state is ∗ = 0943254,9
∗ = 1005 and the low steady state is  = 0943026,  = 099. For policy parameters in10
the PLT regime, set  = 025 and  = 1used by Williams (2010). For the IT rule (8) the11
policy parameter values are assumed to be the usual values  = 15 and  = 054.12
The calibrations for    and ∗ (equivalent to 2% annual inflation) are standard. Gali13
(2008), p.52, recommends  =  = 1 as “commonly used values in business cycle literature”.14
To calibrate , we exploit the relation of the Rotemberg and the Calvo models of costly and15
sticky price adjustments via their reduced form implications for the linearized Phillips curve,16
as in Keen and Wang (2007). We assume an average frequency of about 93 months for price17
adjustment (the mid-range suggested in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008))) which together18
with a conservatively estimated markup of 5% of prices over marginal cost (suggested in Basu19
and Fernald (1997)), which implies  = 21, yields the benchmark value of  of 12821.1320
Sensitivity with respect to initial inflation and output expectations 0 and 0 the key21
state variables, is now studied. Initial conditions on the interest rate 0 and its expectations22
0 are set at the target value, while initial conditions on actual inflation and output are23
set at 0 = 0 + 00001 and 0 = 0 + 00001. Also set 0¯0 = 1003 under PLT. The24
model is simulated under (13) for various values of 0 and 0. 0 ranges from 0935 to25
13Robustness to other calibrations is studied in Section 7.2..
Price Level Targeting with Evolving Credibility 14
1065 at steps of 0002 while 0 varies from 0923254 to 0963254 at steps of 00005 (in terms1
of percentage deviations, output expectations are above and below the target steady state2
output by around 2%, which is displayed in figure 1). From the numerical analysis one has3
the result:
4
Result 1: PLT with opacity is less robust than IT.
5
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
6
Figure 1 illustrates the result by showing numerically computed domains of attraction for7
the two rules.8
5. PLT with Full Credibility9
A publicly made announcement of a target price level path includes useful information10
for forecasting inflation and thus can change the dynamics of the economy via expectations.11
A very simple formulation of inflation forecasting that uses data of the gap between actual12
and target paths of the price level is now introduced. Define the gap variable and an identity13
 = ¯,  ≡ −1 × (∗) (16)14
The identity in (16) is obtained using the definition of the gap and the target path (9).15
Future values of gap  in (16) between the actual and targeted price levels are a natural16
variable for agents to forecast. The associated expectations of inflation can be inferred from17
the forecasted gap as follows. Moving the identity in (16) one period forward, the implied18
inflation forecast can be computed from the equation19
  = ( × ∗) (17)20
assuming as before that information on current values of endogenous variables is not available21
at the time of forecasting.  denotes the forecasted value of the gap for the future periods22
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and  refers to the forecast of the current gap  in the beginning of period .14 Inflation1
forecasts  from (17) are then substituted into the aggregate demand function (14).2
To compute domains of attraction, the expectations and  are updated using steady-
state learning, so that
 = −1 + (−1 −−1) (18)
 = 1−1 + (1− 1)−1, where 1  0. (19)
Note that  for period  made at the end of − 1 is a weighted average of the most recent3
observation −1 and the previous forecast −1 of the gap for period .4
For specifying the values of  and 1 the following considerations seem pertinent. Fore-5
casts  are forecasts for the entire future and then the usual assumption in learning models6
of a quite small  seems natural. In contrast, the forecast  is only about the immediate7
future and then a high weight for the most recent data point −1 is natural, so that the8
specification 1 ≈ 1 is natural. In the numerics 1 = 1 is used but analogous results hold9
for other values for 1. Under full credibility of PLT the price gap expectations follow (18)10
and inflation expectations are given by1511
 = ( × ∗)−1 (20)12
It must be emphasized that in actual learning dynamics private agents use least squares13
regression of the type (11) for  =  in place of (18).14
Given the potential importance of the initial value of the target price path ¯0, it is15
necessary to specify carefully the introduction of the PLT regime in the form of the target16
path {¯}∞=0, where ¯¯−1 = ∗ and the timing in the initial period. PLT is introduced17
in the beginning of period 0 as a surprise and the announcement is made after agents have18
14Note that + =  in more detailed notation.
15Note that output or interest rate expectations do not employ information about the target price level
path unless agents have more sructural knowledge than is assumed here.
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formed their expectations 0, 0 and 0. It is told the policy maker aims to reach the target1
path in the medium term but no information is given about the interest rate rule. From2
period 1 onward agents take the regime to be fully credible and use the target price path in3
their inflation forecasting.4
Robustness of PLT policy regime is now analyzed by computing the (partial) domain of5
attraction for the targeted steady state with focus on sensitivity with respect to displacements6
of initial output expectations 0 and relative price level expectations 0 . Full credibility of7
PLT has dramatic consequences.
8
Result 2: The domain of attraction of the target steady state is very large under the PLT9
rule with full credibility and contains even values for 0 well below the low steady state.
10
The domain of attraction for PLT with full credibility is thus much larger than that of 11
(compare Figure 1, top panel and Figure 2).12
The calibrations are as before. In the computation, the set of possible initial conditions13
for0 and 0 is made large and the initial values of the other variables are at the deflationary14
steady state ˆ = 10001, ˆ = , and  = ˆ are set. Also set 0 = ˆ = 0, 0 = ˆ = 015
and 0 = 0 . The system is high-dimensional, so only partial domains of attraction can be16
illustrated. Figure 2 presents the partial domain of attraction for the PLT policy rule with17
these initial conditions and wide grids for 0 and 0 . The horizontal axis measures 0 and18
vertical axis 0  The grid search for 0 was over the range 094 to 1 at intervals of 00005 (in19
terms of percentage deviations, output expectations are up to 6% above the target steady20
state output, which is what is shown in figure 2) and that for 0 over the range 01 to 2 at21
intervals of 002.
22
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
23
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It is seen that the domain of attraction covers basically the whole area, except the unstable1
low steady state where 0 = 0 = 0.162
Figure 2 shows that incorporating fully credible guidance from the PLT path in agents’3
forecasting can play a key role in moving the economy out of the liquidity trap toward the4
targeted steady state. It must be emphasized that the preceding set of initial conditions5
incorporates large pessimistic shocks that have taken the economy to a situation where the6
ZLB is binding. The mechanism works through resulting deviations of the price level from7
the target path, i.e., the gap variable  which influences formation of inflation expecta-8
tions. A key observation is that if agents have fully incorporated guidance from PLT into9
their expectations formation, the price level target path continues to influence the economy10
through inflation expectations even when ZLB is binding.11
6. Evolving Credibility1712
The result about huge impact of full credibility on the performance of PLT is only an13
extreme case. Assuming full credibility as soon as the PLT policy is announced is not very14
plausible. It usually takes time for agents to learn that the new policy performs better than15
IT. It is, therefore, very important to extend the analysis to cover evolving limited credibility16
where private agents initially put only some, possibly small weight on the target price path17
{¯} when forecasting inflation.18
16Other simulations have been run for a shock to interest rate expectations 0 with analogous results
(details are not reported for reasons of space).
17Imperfect credibility of monetary policy has been introduced in diﬀerent ways in the literature. Imper-
fection is thought to arise, for example, as deviation from RE optimal policy due to the ZLB constraint,
see Bodenstein, Hebden, and Nunes (2012), or from policy maker’s doubt about its model in an RE setting,
see Dennis (2014), or as weighting of diﬀerent models but with the weights remaining constant or evolv-
ing exogenously, see Coenen and Wieland (2004), Gibbs and Kulish (2017) and Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and
Ueberfeldt (2008).
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6.1. Learning through Reinforcement1
This idea is modeled as follows. Agents’ forecast of inflation is assumed to be a weighted2
average of forecasts  and , where  refers to the forecast under full credibility3
defined by (18)-(20) and  refers to the forecast as a constant-gain weighted average of4
past inflation to capture the no credibility scenario. The weights on  and  are assumed5
to evolve in accordance with reinforcement learning based on forecast accuracy.6
Intuitively, reinforcement is an empirical principle such that the higher the payoﬀ (utility)7
from taking an action in the past, the higher the likelihood that the action will be taken8
in the future. A very standard and simple model of reinforcement learning is used.18 The9
analysis is very much a first approach to model evolving credibility and it is acknowledged10
that alternative formulations could be developed.11
Formally, the propensity of each way of forecasting is updated as12
 = −1 + −1 and  = −1 + −1 (21)13
where  ∈ (0 1]. Introduce an auxiliary variable based on the accuracy of forecasting14
˜ =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if
¯¯ − −1¯¯  ¯¯ − −1¯¯
0 otherwise
 (22)
15
and make the innovation terms in (21) utility weighted. Define the weight for the average16
forecast and compute the inflation forecast as a weighted average:17
 =   + (1−  ), where  = 


 + 
and  = 1−   (23)18
Note that the agents’ probability of choosing the forecasting scheme corresponding to full19
credibility   is increasing in the propensity   Other expectation variables  and  are20
updated according to the earlier rules (13). Given these specifications for expectations, the21
18This is a standard formulation of reinforcement learning in game theory, see e.g. p.13 of Young (2004).
See also Chapter 6 of Camerer (2003) for a review of diﬀerent learning models in game theory.
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model is the same as before.19 In order to run simulations of our model,  = 085 is specified1
as a numerical value for the decay (or discount) parameter. Other parameters are as above.2
6.2. Robustness with Evolving Credibility3
Given the very good robustness properties of the PLT policy regime in the extreme case4
of full credibility (shown in Figure 2), it is asked whether the same kind of results can hold in5
the more realistic setting of evolving limited credibility described above. Inflation forecasts6
are assumed to be given by the combination forecasts (23) and forecast weights are updated7
in accordance with reinforcement learning.8
Since the state space is high dimensional, properties of the domain of attraction are9
studied by fixing some initial values for the process. In particular, the three variables of10
interest are 0 0 and 0 , where the dimension of initial inflation expectations is reduced11
by assuming 0 = 0 = 0 For ease of presentation, the domain of attraction results12
are presented by fixing one of these variables and varying the remaining two. For the first13
exercise, fix 0 and vary 0 and 0 to plot the partial domain of attraction (see Figure 3).
14
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
15
Our interest is to consider the possibility to escape from a state of the economy where16
ZLB and recession prevail. Output expectations 0 are now fixed at three diﬀerent values17
and the initial inflation expectations 0 =  =  are varied along with the initial18
degree of credibility of the PLT policy regime, 0 . For each combination (0 0) the lowest19
value for 0 of the initial degree of credibility such that the dynamics of learning from this20
starting point converge to the target steady state is computed numerically. There are three21
alternative values for 0: one slightly above the targeted steady state output (by roughly22
005%), the second one at this target level and the third one at the output level corresponding23
19The model with steady state learning is used for computing domains of attraction.
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to the low steady state i.e. 0 = ˆ. A grid of points (0  0) is then done where the relation1
between the degree of initial credibility 0 and 0 is shown for the diﬀerent values of 02
indicated above.3
Figure 3 shows the domain of attraction in (0  0) space when initial output expectation4
0 is fixed at the three diﬀerent initial levels just described. In all of these panels, interest5
rate expectations are fixed marginally above the ZLB (at 10002), to capture the economy6
being stuck around the ZLB.7
In the top panel of Figure 3, 0 is slightly higher than the level of output at the target8
steady state. As this figure shows, even deflationary expectations close to 0 = 09 (more9
than 40% deflation in annual terms!) yield stability with high enough initial credibility.10
More generally, 0 well below the low steady state value ˆ ≈  yields stability even with low11
credibility. Announcement of PLT with even low credibility suﬃces to increase the domain12
of attraction significantly to below zero net inflation levels. (Compare with the domain of13
attraction shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1 for the PLT regime with opacity.)14
The middle panel of Figure 3 shows the domain of attraction in (0  0) space when15
initial output expectations, 0 = ∗ i.e. at the target level of output. Note that convergence16
to the target steady state continues to obtain for deflationary expectations though the values17
can’t be as low as in the top panel. Nevertheless, deflationary expectations (approximately18
098 which is below the low steady state value ˆ ≈  ) continue to give convergence.19
Finally, the bottom panel shows the domain of attraction when initial output expecta-20
tions, 0 = ˆ i.e. at the low steady state output. 0 values down to the low steady state21
value ˆ ≈  continue to give convergence for all values of initial credibility between 0 and22
1 (note that ˆ ≈  is 4% annual deflation, something which is seldom observed). This is23
particularly striking since initial output expectations are very pessimistic in this figure. In24
summary:
25
Result 3: The announcement of the PLT regime coupled with very small initial credibility26
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can make the economy converge back to the targeted steady state from initial conditions with1
inflation expectations well below the target steady state.
2
This result is in sharp contrast with the case of the PLT regime with opacity. At first3
sight limited credibility might be thought as a weighted average of the cases of no and full4
credibility analyzed before. The full intuition is, however, more complex as the existence5
of the possibility for forecasting that uses the target price level path influences the actual6
inflation path which in turn aﬀects also the outcome from simple statistical forecasting.7
These combined self-referential and feedback eﬀects are the key to Result 3.208
Another observation is that higher the initial credibility, 0  larger is the size of the do-9
main of attraction: lower and lower deflation rates may be supported in terms of convergence10
to the targeted steady state as illustrated by the downward sloping lines of the convergence11
boundary in the top two panels in Figure 3 in (0  0) space. Higher credibility thus has12
beneficial eﬀects: however, these eﬀects are less evident when initial output expectations13
are very pessimistic as shown by the nearly horizontal line in the bottom panel of Figure 3.14
The message here is that if the policy maker contemplates a move to PLT during a liquidity15
trap scenario, it should not wait too long since output expectations can then become very16
pessimistic making it more diﬃcult to get out of this situation.17
It is also possible to compare PLT with evolving credibility to the IT regime. It turns18
out that IT is more robust than PLT when initial inflation expectations are at a high value,19
but PLT even with low degree of credibility is superior to IT when initial inflation expec-20
tations are in the deflationary domain.21 With deflationary expectations IT always leads21
to a deflationary spiral no matter what output expectations are whereas convergence to de-22
sired steady state can take place with PLT. PLT is superior in times of binding ZLB and23
pessimistic inflation/output expectations.24
20This intuition and the case of very small degree of initial credibility are discussed in Appendix D.
21This observation is distinct from the usual criticism of PLT saying that if inflation (and output) are
above target and a negative shock hits the economy, the history-dependence of PLT delays the adjustment.
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This analysis lends strong support to the suggestions of Evans (2012), Williams (2017)1
and Bernanke (2017) that guidance from price-level targeting can be very helpful in a liquidity2
trap. Monetary policy alone is able to pull the economy out of the liquidity trap if PLT can3
be implemented. It is, however, important to add the qualification that PLT is a good policy4
only during a liquidity trap scenario.
5
Result 4: In terms of the robustness criterion (i.e. domain of attraction) PLT is globally6
a better policy than IT during a deflationary/liquidity trap scenario while IT is the better7
policy globally during normal times.
8
7. Swedish Experience with Price Level Targeting9
As noted in the Introduction, Sweden is the only country which has experimented with10
monetary policy to achieve price level stabilization which is arguably akin to PLT (For details11
see Jonung (1979) and Berg and Jonung (1999)). In September 1931 the Riksbank and the12
Swedish government decided to abandon the gold standard and to adopt a new domestic13
paper standard with the September 1931 price level adopted as the initial target price level14
in the policy regime. This move was a response to Swedish consumer and wholesale prices15
that had declined sharply from 1929 up to the first three quarters of 1931. This monetary16
regime lasted only about two years as Sweden decided in June-July 1933 to peg its currency17
to Pound Sterling.2218
This two-year episode of PLT in Sweden took place in the middle of the Great Depression:19
GDP declined in years 1930-33 while price deflation which started in 1929 ended in 1934.20
The policy interest rate declined somewhat from 1930 to the beginning of 1931 and was21
significantly raised during 1931 Q3 just before the new policy regime started. The rate22
22The Minister of Finance declared that the aim of Swedish monetary policy should be to preserve the
domestic purchasing power of the krona using ‘all means available’. We note the choice of initial target price
level can have significant eﬀects after introduction of price stabilization. This is witnessed by comparing
Swedish 1930’s policy with 1920’s return to gold standard. See Online Appendix F1 for simulation results.
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was gradually brought down from September 1931 to the end of 1933 which contributed to1
gradual elimination of price deflation.2
7.1. Simulation Results3
Time paths from the model are compared to actual data of the price level, interest rate4
and aggregate output.23 The simulations use the calibrated model with evolving credibility5
described in Sections 2-6. The basic parameters used in the model simulations are mostly6
the same as in the basic model (see Section 4.2.) with the important exceptions that ∗ = 1,7
 = 015 and  = 0.  = 0 is a policy of strict PLT, in line with the Ministry of Finance’s8
announcement (footnote 22), and the value of  is in the mid range of the possible values9
considered by Williams (2010) (the results are not sensitive to  though). ∗ = 1 interprets10
price stability as a zero target inflation rate and the interest rate lower bound in the policy11
rule is set at  = 1001.12
Government fiscal policy is assumed to be constant, except for the random shocks.24 The13
initial conditions are set to be close to the low steady state. As output in the data in 193114
declined, the initial conditions are set at the low steady state 0 =  and 0 = . As15
inflation data around 1931 shows very small deflation, 0 and 0 are slightly below ∗16
with actual inflation just below expectations. The price gap and level are set at 0 = 1,17
0 = 1 while 0 = 1 in line with the start of PLT policy in Sept 1931. Initial interest rate18
and its expectation are set at 0 = 1015 and 0 = 10106 which are between the quarterly19
data points in 1931 Q2 and Q3. Initial credibility is set to 0 = 01 while  = 08. The gain20
parameter is set at the baseline value of 0002 and the initial values for PLM parameters are21
23Our perspective is of adaptive learning which we believe is more plausible for policy changes as considered
here for Sweden (see also discussion in Appendix C1, final two paragraphs and footnote 47). We comment
briefly on RE dynamics under the ZLB constraint  = 1. With IT, the dynamic RE solution paths converge
to the liquidity trap steady state or to a limit cycle (see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001)). As
near the low steady state the RE paths for PLT are identical to IT, a continuum of convergent RE paths to
the liquidity trap steady state exist also under PLT.
24The autocorrelation coeﬃcient  in the government spending process (4) is set to 085 with shocks 
generated from a uniform distribution with support [−001 001]. Output at the target and low steady states
are ∗ = 0911636 and  = 0911467 here.
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at initial RE values with AR terms set at 0.1
The simulation of the model economy with a Wicksellian PLT rule (10), adapted to2
Swedish 1931 Q3 initial conditions, is now compared to actual Swedish data for the price3
level, interest rate and aggregate output in Figure 4 (which reports the median values from4
500 replications of the shock process). The focus is on the period 1931 Q3 to 1933 Q35
when Sweden used PLT. The comparison is continued for a further five years, so that it6
is possible to see what a Wicksellian PLT policy would have implied for the economy in7
the longer term, providing a useful counterfactual to the actual Swedish scenario. Figure8
4 shows the time paths of price level, interest rate and output in the simulated economy9
and corresponding data. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation and10
first-order autocorrelation) for the variables for the two years of PLT.
11
FIGURE 4 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
12
We first summarize the main features of the data. The price level is proxied by the13
quarterly cost of living index. Prices fell over a period of 2 years since September 1931 and14
rose afterwards till the onset of the Second World War. The data shows sharp declines in15
interest rates for the two years PLT was in operation and was then subsequently stuck at16
2.5%. The fall in the price level and interest rates during 1931 Q3 -1933 Q3 is consistent with17
a PLT rule (the correlation between these two variables in the data is 0.83). Subsequently,18
the period of fixed interest rates also coincides with the rise in prices till the Second World19
War.20
The output in the model corresponds to GDP; however, GDP data during this period21
is only available at annual frequency. Data on industrial production is available quarterly22
but this tends to be very volatile (unlike GDP). The figure shows two measures of aggregate23
output: (i) GDP (the annual series is converted to quarterly series through a step increase)24
and (ii) industrial production. GDP data is relatively stable during the two years of PLT25
implementation (there is a slight decline followed by a slight rise). Afterwards, however, there26
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are relatively large rises in GDP (and industrial production) till the end of 1930s caused by1
a variety of factors explained below: these and other considerations noted below may cause2
diﬃculties in matching GDP for the model.3
Thus, the stylized facts, during the two years PLT was in operation, are the decline4
in prices and interest rates and the relatively stable path of GDP. We see if our simple5
benchmark model is able to capture these stylized facts.6
Table 1 shows that almost all moments computed from the model are quite close to7
the corresponding moments in the data providing some evidence the model series behaves8
similarly to the actual data.25 Next we explain the dynamics. Qualitatively, both the cost9
of living index from the data and the price level index from the model fall during the two10
year period from September 1931. In fact, magnitudes of the fall during this period are11
comparable; while the cost of living index falls by 385%, the corresponding fall in the price12
index is by 345%. Similarly, interest rate from the data and model both fall during the13
period. Even quantitatively, these falls are comparable: while the interest rate in the data14
falls from 10125 to 100625 (a fall of 00062%) during the two year period, the corresponding15
fall in the model interest rate is from 10096 to 10044 (a fall of 00052%). Finally, output16
increases by 04% in the model simulation while GDP falls by 047% during this two year17
period.18
In summary, the model can describe well the central macro aspects of the Swedish ex-19
periment with PLT. In particular, the fall in prices and interest rates in the data are well20
matched by the model, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Even the match for GDP is21
reasonable (there is not much fluctuation in either model or data for this period).22
We briefly compare the model with data after the PLT period. After around two years23
of PLT, monetary policy regime was radically changed. The Swedish krona was pegged to24
25The standard deviation of output is lower while the autocorrelation of interest rate is higher in the model
compared to the data. Appendix E2 provides some further formal statistical evidence that the model and
real data of price level and interest rate follow the same process.
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pound sterling and the central bank adopted a constant policy interest rate for the rest of1
1930’s. This rate was set at  = 100625 (in quarterly terms) which was a percentage point2
higher than the corresponding policy rate in the UK. The actual interest rate policy after3
1933 Q3 is quite diﬀerent from the Wicksellian PLT policy implied by the model. The second4
panel of Figure 4 shows that in the model the interest rate with Wicksellian policy begins to5
rise as the economy recovers and converges to the target steady state.26 The price level from6
the model, like the cost of living index in the data, rises over the subsequent five year period7
and the match continues to be quite well during this period, see the top panel of Figure 4.8
On the other hand, the match for output dynamics gets poor when compared to data9
after the PLT period: the significant increase in output is not captured. The relatively large10
rises in GDP (and industrial production) in the post-PLT period was caused by a variety of11
factors not present in the model e.g. large changes in government spending and investment12
due to the increased possibility of a war and significant growth in foreign trade, see Figure 313
in Jonung (1979). The model, on the other hand, describes a closed economy without capital14
or growth in productivity (and potential output) and has a constant mean of government15
spending.16
7.2. Sensitivity Analysis of Model Predictions17
The parameters of interest are primarily the preference parameters in the utility function18
( ) and the parameter relating to price rigidity (). Sensitivity analysis of the model19
with respect to these parameters is now carried out. The adopted ranges for the key utility20
function parameters are  = 05 1 2 3 4 and  = 05 08 1 2 while those for  are 42, 12821
and 350. For  our values are consistent with Chetty (2006) who suggests a mean value of22
07 and maximum values around 3. The parameter  governs the Frisch elasticity of labor23
supply and there is debate surrounding its value. We take a range of values consistent with24
26In contrast, with the actual policy of constant interest rates there is instability of the low steady state
and, so if the policy were maintained for a long time in the model, the economy would most likely experience
explosive inflation.
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the recent literature e.g. Chetty et al (2011), Fiorito et al (2012) and consider values of1
 of 05 075 1 and 2 covering ranges of the Frisch elasticity (−1) from 05 to 2 (see also2
the discussion in section 2.3 of Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2013)). As mentioned,3
the benchmark value of  = 12821 assumes an average frequency of price adjustment of4
about 93 months and a markup of 5% Using an average frequency of price adjustment of5
about 145 months suggested in Kehoe and Midrigan (2015, p.37) and a markup of 5% yields6
 = 350 (the latter value is used in Benbabib et al (2014) and Benbabib et al (2001)). As7
an alternative, a higher 15% markup (belonging to an upper range of available empirical8
estimates; Basu and Fernald (1997)) with average frequency of price changes of 93 months9
yields  = 42.
10
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
11
Table 2 reports the root mean squared errors (RMSE) between simulated and actual data12
for the price level, the interest rate and GDP computed over 2.5 years from the adoption of13
PLT in September 1931. Table 2 uses the value  = 12821 and reports the results for the14
diﬀerent values of  and . Determining the calibration that fits closest to the data from15
Table 2 is dependent on the criterion.27 The sum of the three RMSEs is a possible criterion16
but  has to be scaled up as  and  are measured as index numbers. The best fitting17
calibration is then  =  = 2 but the benchmark  =  = 1 turns out to be second best and18
nearly as good, see Table 3.19
RMSE for the calibrations with  = 42 and 350 are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2 in20
Online Appendix E3. Briefly,  = 42 and 128 are generally better than  = 350 and the21
benchmark,  =  = 1 continues to perform well with  = 42 The simulated paths for price22
level and interest rate have the same qualitative patterns as the actual data across for all of23
27RMSE (or root mean absolute error (RMAE)) is a statistical measure and econometricians often use it to
judge the fit of out-of-sample forecasting. Here we use this criterion to judge the fit of diﬀerent calibrations
vis-à-vis the data (use of RMAE gives similar results). We multiply the RMSE of  by 100, which makes
the scale comparable to those of  and  and is an approximation of an index number scale.
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the calibrations during the PLT period as shown in Figures A.5-A.7 in Online Appendix E31
(see this appendix for further details). Overall, it can be concluded that the NK model with2
evolving credibility is consistent with the actual Swedish experience of PLT in 1931-19333
during which the economy gradually turned from recession to positive growth.4
8. Conclusions5
Our analysis has two important starting points. The nonlinear global version of a stan-6
dard framework is used to study the implications of the interest rate lower bound for PLT.7
Agents have imperfect knowledge so their expectations are not rational during a transition8
after a shock.9
The paper has introduced the domain of attraction of the target steady state in learning10
dynamics as a new way of assessing of PLT. PLT has been recently suggested as a possi-11
ble improvement over inflation targeting monetary policy for the current environment with12
low inflation and low output growth. The results indicate that the performance of PLT is13
clearly better than inflation targeting, provided private agents’ learning has at least partly14
incorporated the guidance from the price level target path. If private agents’ learning does15
not use the guidance at all, IT has a larger domain of attraction than PLT. Credibility of16
the PLT regime is important for its success. It is also shown that model simulations with17
some initial credibility lead to dynamics that are consistent with Swedish experience of price18
stabilization in 1930’s.19
The current results are a first step in this kind of analysis. Several extensions can be20
considered. The liquidity trap is sometimes modelled as a shift in the target steady state to21
ZLB region as a result of a persistent but non-permanent shock to the discount parameter,22
see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). The general flavor of the results in this paper would23
probably also hold for this other formulation. Another extension arises from noting that24
standard policy rules and policy parameters have been used, but these do not represent25
Price Level Targeting with Evolving Credibility 29
optimal policies. One could consider optimizing the parameter values of the instrument1
rules. The comparison of diﬀerent policy regimes are limited by the assumption that the2
economy starts in a given IT regime and with given initial expectations. Analyzing how and3
why private agents might change their forecasting practices after the introduction of a new4
regime would be worth while.5
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1
Figure 1: Domain of attraction for IT (top panel) and that for PLT with opacity (bottom
panel). Horizontal axis gives 0 (in deviation from target steady state output) and vertical
axis 0. Shaded area indicates convergence. The circle in the shaded region denotes the
intended steady state and the circle outside the shaded region denotes the unintended
steady state.
2
3
Figure 2: Domain of attraction for PLT with forecasting of gaps when initial conditions are
close to the low steady state. Horizontal axis gives 0 (in deviation from target steady state
output) and vertical axis gives 0 . The circle represents the targeted steady state. Shaded
area indicates convergence.
4
5
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1
Figure 3: Domain of attraction for PLT with imperfect credibility corresponding to
diﬀerent levels of initial output expectations: Diﬀerent degrees of initial credibility 0 are
along the horizontal axis and inflation expectations are along the vertical axis. Output
expectations are fixed just (0048 %) above the target steady state output in the top panel,
at the target steady state in the middle panel and at the low steady state in the bottom
panel.
2
3
4
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Figure 4: Top panel: median price level dynamics for the model economy (red curve) and
actual price level data from 1931 Q3 to 1938 Q2 (blue curve). The price data is the
quarterly cost of living index. Middle panel: simulated median interest rate dynamics (red
line) and the actual interest rate data from 1931 Q3 to 1938 Q2 (blue line). Bottom panel:
median output dynamics (red line) and actual GDP data (blue line) from 1931 Q3 to 1938
Q2. Only annual data on GDP available which is shown as a step function. The second
measure is industrial production shown as the dashed line. Initial output and price level
are normalized to 100 while interest rate is at usual quarterly values in the figure.
1
2
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Mean Mean Std Dev Std Dev Autocorr Autocorr
 98.5577 97.9145 1.59798 1.2793 0.619 0.639
 1.0090 1.0064 0.00186 0.00190 0.367 0.634
 98.9142 100.274 0.640023 0.155199 0.537 0.536
3
Table 1: Moments from the data and model calculated for the two years PLT was in4
operation for the benchmark case displayed in Figure 4.5
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 = 05  = 075  = 1  = 2
 = 05 0.992551 0.891579 0.952334 1.6614
  = 1 1.20441 1.08501 0.989177 1.00528
 = 2 1.50706 1.38148 1.26713 1.03783
 = 3 2.13353 2.04289 1.90173 1.52487
 = 05 0.0667299 0.101701 0.14864 0.303788
  = 1 0.0696979 0.0670699 0.0798806 0.162435
 = 2 0.0872422 0.0878827 0.087326 0.10227
 = 3 0.127361 0.11875 0.11593 0.103483
 = 05 1.66297 1.61673 1.57892 1.45812
  = 1 1.50567 1.49825 1.48445 1.44544
 = 2 1.34993 1.35987 1.36604 1.37644
 = 3 1.28015 1.28769 1.28897 1.31687
1
Table 2: Root Mean Square Errors in price level  , output  and normalized interest rate2
 for the calibration  = 128
3
 = 05  = 075  = 1  = 2
 = 05 2.72225 2.61001 2.6798 3.42331
sum   = 1 2.77978 2.65033 2.55351 2.61316
 = 2 2.94423 2.82923 2.7205 2.51654
 = 3 3.54104 3.44933 3.30663 2.94522
4
Table 3: Sum of Root Mean Square Errors of Price level  , output  and normalized5
interest rate  for the calibration  = 1286
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Online Appendices1
(not for printed publication)
2
These appendices provide numerous details and discuss further topics of interest:3
1. Derivation of the Phillips curve and the aggregate demand function used in the analysis4
(Appendix A).5
2. Discussion of the literature on PLT and learning (Appendix B).6
3. Basic theoretical results about the multiplicity of steady states, their determinacy and7
stability under learning (Appendix C).8
4. Intuition for robustness results, details for numerical analysis, intuition for dynamics9
with limited credibility (Appendix D).10
5. Details and further material for the Swedish case (Appendix E).11
6. Results about setting the initial target price in terms of volatility, dynamics and domain12
of attraction (Appendix F).13
A Model Derivations14
A1. Optimal Decisions for Private Sector15
In period  each household  is assumed to maximize its anticipated utility (1) under
given expectations. As in Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), the first-order conditions
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for an optimum yield
0 = − +  ( − 1)
1
 (24)
+
µ
1− 1
¶
1 
(1−1)

 
− − 
1
(+1 − 1)+1
− = 
¡−1+1−+1¢  (25)1
where +1 = +1 and () denotes the (not necessarily rational) expectations of2
agents  formed in period .3
Equation (24) is one form of the nonlinear New Keynesian Phillips curve describing the4
optimal price-setting by firms. The term ( − 1) arises from the quadratic form of the5
adjustment costs, and this expression is increasing in  over the allowable range  ≥ 126
To interpret this equation, the first term on the right-hand side is the marginal disutility of7
labor while the third term can be viewed as the product of the marginal revenue from an8
extra unit of labor with the marginal utility of consumption. The terms involving current9
and future inflation arise from the price-adjustment costs. Equation (25) is the standard10
Euler equation giving the intertemporal first-order condition for the consumption path.11
Proceed now to rewrite the decision rules for consumption and inflation so that they12
depend on forecasts of key variables over the infinite horizon (IH).13
A2. The Infinite-horizon Phillips Curve14
Starting with (24), let15
 = ( − 1) (26)16
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The appropriate root for given  is  ≥ 1
2
and so  ≥ −1
4
must be imposed to have a1
meaningful model. Using the production function  = 1 one can rewrite (24) as2
 = 
(1+)
 −  − 1 
1
 (−1) − + +1 (27)3
and using the demand curve  = ()− gives
 =  ()
−(1+)(1+) −  − 1 ()
−(−1)− + +1
Defining
 ≡  ()
−(1+) (1+) −  − 1 ()
−(−1)−
and iterating the Euler equation28 yields4
 =  +
∞X
=1
+ (28)
5
provided that the transversality condition6
+ → 0 as  →∞ (29)7
holds. It can be shown that (29) is an implication of the necessary transversality condition8
for optimal price setting. For further details see Benhabib, Evans, and Honkapohja (2014).9
The variable + is a mixture of aggregate variables and the agent’s own future decisions.10
Thus it provides only a “conditional decision rule”.29 This equation for  can be the basis11
28It is assumed that expectations satisfy the law of iterated expectations.
29Conditional demand and supply functions are well known concepts in microeconomic theory.
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for decision-making as follows. So far only the agent’s price-setting Euler equation and the1
above limiting condition (29) have been used. Some further assumptions are now made.2
Agents are assumed to have point expectations, so that their decisions depend only on3
the mean of their subjective forecasts. The model outlined in Section 2 stipulates that all4
agents  have the same utility and production functions. Initial money and debt holdings,5
and prices are assumed to be identical.6
The assumption of representative agents includes private agents’ forecasting, so that the7
agents have homogenous forecasts of the relevant variables. Thus all agents make the same8
decisions at each point in time. It is also assumed that from the past agents have learned9
the market clearing relation in temporary equilibrium, i.e.  =  −  in per capita terms10
and thus agents impose in their forecasts that + = + − +, where + = ¯ +  ˜.11
In the case of constant fiscal policy this becomes + = + − ¯.12
It follows from the assumption of representative agents that in temporary equilibrium13
that for all periods including the current one  = 0 =  for all agents  and 0, see p.14
224 in Benhabib, Evans, and Honkapohja (2014). In that paper it was additionally assumed15
that agents’ expectations also satisfy  + =  + for future periods  = 1 2 16
This assumption is not necessary and is adopted here purely as a simplification.30 If the17
possibility  + 6=  + is allowed for, then the future income ++ + of agent  can diﬀer18
from future output +. Even then ex post income and product are equal as  =  in19
temporary equilibrium for the current period. For generality one could introduce distinct20
expectations for future output and future income but these two variables would have the21
30More extensive discussion of the generalization is available upon request.
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same realized data and thus identical learning rules except for diﬀerent past expectations.1
The analysis is simplified by setting  + =  + for future periods and thus we do not2
distinguish between the income and output from agents’ productive activity.3
In summary, for optimal price setting one obtains the infinite Phillips curve (5).4
A3. The Consumption Function5
To derive the consumption function from (25), use the flow budget constraint and the
NPG condition to obtain an intertemporal budget constraint.31 First, define the asset wealth
 = 
as the holdings of real bonds and write the flow budget constraint as6
 +  =  −Υ + −1 (30)7
where  = −1. Note that () =  is assumed, i.e. the representative agent8
assumption is being invoked. Iterating (30) forward and imposing9
lim→∞(
+)−1+ = 0 (31)10
where
+ = +1
Y
=2
+−1
+
31Recall that the model is a cashless limit of the corresponding models in the cited earlier literature.
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with + = +−1+, one obtains the life-time budget constraint of the household
0 = −1 + Φ +
∞X
=1
(+)−1Φ+ (32)
= −1 +  −  +
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+ − +) (33)
where
Φ+ = + −Υ+ − + (34)
+ = Φ+ + + = + −Υ+
Here all expectations are formed in period , which is indicated in the notation for +1
but is omitted from the other expectational variables.2
Invoking the relations3
+ = (+)1 (35)4
which are an implication of the consumption Euler equation (25), yields5
(1− )−1 = −1 +  −Υ +
∞X
=1
(+)−1+ −
∞X
=1
(+)−1(+)1 (36)
6
As we have + = + −Υ+, we have
 =
Ã
1 +
∞X
=1
(+)(1−)
!−1Ã
−1 +
∞X
=0
(+)−1+
!

So far it is not assumed that households act in a Ricardian way, i.e. they have not imposed
the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) of the government. To simplify the analysis, it
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is assumed that consumers are Ricardian, which allows to modify the consumption function
as in Evans and Honkapohja (2010).32 The government flow constraint is
 +Υ = ¯ + ˜ + −1 or  = ∆ + −1 where ∆ = ¯ + ˜ −Υ
By forward substitution, and assuming1
lim→∞+ + = 0 (37)2
one gets3
0 = −1 +∆ +
∞X
=1
−1+∆+ (38)
4
Note that ∆+ is the primary government deficit in +, measured as government purchases
less lump-sum taxes. Under the Ricardian assumption, agents at each time  expect this
constraint to be satisfied, i.e.
0 = −1 +∆ +
∞X
=1
(+)−1∆+ where
∆+ = ¯ +  ˜ −Υ+ for  = 1 2 3    
A Ricardian consumer assumes that (37) holds. His flow budget constraint (30) can then
be written as:
 = −1 + , where  =  −Υ − 
The relevant transversality condition is now (37). Iterating forward and using (35) together5
with (37) yields the consumption function (5) in the main text.6
32Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2012) state the assumptions under which Ricardian Equivalence holds
along a path of temporary equilibria with learning if agents have an infinite decision horizon.
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The aggregate demand function takes the form1
 =  +
Ã ∞X
=1
(+)(1−)
!−1 ∞X
=1
(+)−1(+ − (¯ +  ˜)) (39)
2
B Discussion of Literature on PLT and on Learning3
B1. Literature on PLT and Learning4
Starting with comments to the literature on PLT, it is important to note a seminal paper5
by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). They use the RE approach to argue that PLT gives6
guidance in terms of history-dependence of monetary policy and is a good policy under the7
ZLB constraint.33 Rational expectations (RE) is, however, a very strong assumption about8
the agents’ knowledge of the economy. This is so especially if the economy is in a recession9
and faces risks of deflation while policy makers contemplate a move from IT to PLT. The10
assumption of RE becomes informationally very demanding in this scenario especially if11
agents have had no prior experience with PLT.12
The key starting point in this paper is to relax the RE hypothesis and instead use the13
assumption that private agents operate under imperfect knowledge and learning. Recent14
papers that relax the RE assumption in the context of macroeconomic policy analysis include15
Taylor andWilliams (2010) andWoodford (2013). The learning approach is increasingly used16
in the literature. For discussion and analytical results concerning adaptive learning in a wide17
range of macroeconomic models, see for example Sargent (1993), Evans and Honkapohja18
(2001), Sargent (2008) and Evans and Honkapohja (2009b, 2013). The recent survey paper19
33Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006) are other contributions that employ the RE approach. Ambler (2009),
Cournede and Moccero (2009) and Hatcher and Minford (2014) survey the literature on PLT.
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Eusepi and Preston (2018) gives an extensive discussion of diﬀerent aspects of monetary1
policy from the perspective of the learning approach. Importance of communication about2
the policy instrument rule in inflation targeting policies is emphasized in Eusepi (2010) and3
Eusepi and Preston (2010). For PLT the key issue is actually the announcement of the future4
target path of the price level by the central bank (rather than transparency of the interest5
rule per se).6
It is also worth mentioning two papers that do experimental research on PLT. Amano,7
Engle-Warnick and Shukayev (2011) report on experiments about the eﬀects of announcing8
a move to PLT and show that the adjustment of inflation forecasts to RE benchmark is9
gradual and not instantaneous. The gradualism is broadly in line with the hypothesis of10
learning since agents use past data in the updating. A more precise look at their data would11
be warranted. Hommes and Makarewicz (2016) employ a DSGE model with Euler equation12
learning and consider the eﬀects of four diﬀerent versions of the Wicksellian rule (called PLT13
Taylor rule) together with IT Taylor rule as fifth benchmark case. The experimental results14
by Hommes and Makarewicz show the importance of a strong response from the Wicksellian15
rule (i.e. large policy parameters) and a limited role for guidance.16
Gradual adjustment of expectations is a central part in the description of economic17
dynamics with adaptive learning. In this approach agents maximize in each period their18
anticipated utility or profit subject to expectations that are derived from an econometric19
forecasting model given the data available at the time of forecasting. The model is updated20
over time with arrival of new information. Agents know their own structural characteristics21
but not those of other agents. Thus individual agents have much less information than under22
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RE. The learning approach contrasts with the existing literature on PLT that, as mentioned,1
is to large extent based on the RE hypothesis.34 In the earlier literature Orphanides and2
Williams (2002), Orphanides andWilliams (2007) and Orphanides andWilliams (2013) argue3
that PLT can be eﬀective when there is structural change and uncertainty.35 It is noted that4
all of the cited studies use linearized models for their analysis.5
This paper instead uses a nonlinear micro-founded New Keynesian (NK) model when6
private agents learn adaptively using infinite horizon forecasts advocated by Preston (2005)7
and Preston (2006), and used in Evans and Honkapohja (2010) and Benhabib, Evans, and8
Honkapohja (2014) to study the properties of a liquidity trap.36 The nonlinear framework is9
needed to assess the global properties of policy targeting regimes, including the possibility10
of multiple equilibria created by the ZLB.3711
B2. Formulation of Learning12
Section 3. describes how agents forecast future inflation, output and the interest rate.13
Thus their PLMs are given by (11) and their forecasts by (12). For the analysis of domains14
of attraction agents form expectations using steady state learning with point expectations15
formalized by equation (13) in the paper.  in (13) is called the “gain sequence” and16
measures the extent of adjustment of the estimates to the most recent forecast error. In17
34There is also a literature that incorporates imperfect information, credibility and optimal filtering about
some limited aspects of the economy, but RE is otherwise maintained, see e.g. Faust and Svensson (2001)
and Erceg and Levin (2003) for applications to monetary policy.
35Aspects of imperfect knowledge are also included in the discussion of price-level targeting by Gaspar,
Smets, and Vestin (2007) and Williams (2010).
36The forecasting horizon is one modeling choice in the learning approach. See Honkapohja, Mitra, and
Evans (2013) for a discussion of infinite-horizon and short-horizon learning in contexts of monetary policy.
37Global aspects of monetary (and fiscal) policy in nonlinear models have recently been studied under both
RE and adaptive learning. See e.g. Eusepi (2007), Benhabib and Eusepi (2005), Eusepi (2010), Benhabib,
Evans, and Honkapohja (2014) and the references therein.
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stochastic systems one often sets  = −1 and this “decreasing gain” learning corresponds1
to classic least-squares updating. Steady state learning then corresponds to least-squares2
regression on an intercept. Also widely used is the case  = , for 0    1, called3
“constant gain” learning. In this case it is assumed that  is small. Under decreasing gains4
possible convergence to a fixed point is asymptotically to an RE equilibrium. Under constant5
gain convergence is toward a random variable centered near the equilibrium. If the model6
is non-stochastic, then constant gain may converge exactly to the (non-stochastic) steady7
state.8
The study of evolving credibility by means of reinforcement learning in Section 6. adds a9
new layer to the learning processes of agents. Here reinforcement learning is formally a way10
of describing the evolution of weights in averaging of the forecasting models used by agents.3811
It is noted that in addition to model averaging and reinforcement learning there are other12
approaches to learning with multiple forecasting models. Models of dynamic predictor selec-13
tion assume that (i) heterogenous agents make costly choices between competing forecasting14
models based on fitness computed from past performance and (ii) cross-sectional shocks15
lead to nonlinear gradual evolution of aggregate variables.39 Yet another approach studies16
evolution of learning with occasional model switching arising from hypothesis testing.4017
38A literature on implications of model averaging for adaptive learning can also be noted, see Evans,
Honkapohja, Sargent, and Williams (2013), Gibbs (2015), Cho and Kasa (2017) and Gibbs and Kulish
(2017).
39See e.g. Branch and McGough (2010), De Grauwe (2011) and for a survey Branch and McGough (2016).
40For example, see Foster and Young (2003), Cho and Kasa (2013) and Norman (2015).
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B3. Technical Details on Learning1
Here the least-squares updating rule for the PLM (11) is described for the case without
credibility. Agents are assumed to use constant gain recursive least squares (RLS). The
parameter estimates based on data through time  are
 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝


⎞
⎟⎟⎠   =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝


⎞
⎟⎟⎠   =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝


⎞
⎟⎟⎠  =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1
˜
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 
The RLS formulae corresponding to estimates of equations (11) are
 = −1 + R−1 ( − −1)
 = −1 + R−1 ( − −1)
 = −1 + R−1 ( − −1)
R = R−1 + (0 −R−1)
0    1 is the “gain” parameter that discounts old data at rate 1 −  per period (taken2
to be one quarter), to allow for adaptation of parameters to structural changes like policy3
changes. We assume that parameter estimates under learning are updated at the end of the4
period. Thus in time , when expectations are formed, agents observe the current value of5
the exogenous variable ˜ but use estimates −1, −1, −1 in making forecasts.6
In the case of full credibility agents consider the gap variable  = ¯ and run regres-7
sions8
 =  +  ˜−1 +  (40)9
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make forecasts
+ = −1 + −1 ˜
and estimate parameters
 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝


⎞
⎟⎟⎠
using
 = −1 + R−1 ( − −1)
The PLM (40), forecasts from it and the estimation of the parameters is done in place of1
inflation forecasting using LS learning in the case of no credibility.2
For the case of full credibility inflation forecasts are calculated from the equation
+ = (+ × ∗)+−1,  ≥ 2
where +−1 is the expected nowcast for period + and for  ≥ 2 it is given by the forecast3
for the preceding period. For  = 1 we have +1 = (+1 × ∗)−14
The full system of learning under full credibility is as follows. The PLM is
 =  +  ˜−1 + 
 =  + ˜−1 + 
 =  + ˜−1 + 
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and the forecasts are
+ = −1 + −1 ˜ (41)
+ = −1 + −1 ˜
+ = −1 + −1 ˜
with
+ = (+ × ∗)+−1,  ≥ 2 and +1 = (+1 × ∗)−1
The latter are inserted into the behavioral functions.1
If there is imperfect credibility, agents use the forecast from (41) and the forecast com-2
puted as a constant-gain weighted average of past inflation, as the alternatives in the rein-3
forcement learning, as described in the main text.4
C Basic Theoretical Results5
C1. Multiple Steady States and Determinacy416
The temporary equilibrium equations of the model with steady-state learning are:7
41The ZLB and multiple equilibria for an inflation targeting framework and a Taylor-type interest rate
rule has been analyzed in Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001)
and related literature. These issues have been considered under learning, e.g., in Evans and Honkapohja
(2010), Benhabib, Evans, and Honkapohja (2014) and Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra (2016). Existence of
the two steady states under PLT was pointed out in Evans and Honkapohja (2013), section 2.5.3.
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1. The aggregate demand
 =  (      ) (42)
≡ ¯ +
"µ

¶−1Ã
1− 1
µ

¶(1−)!#
( − ¯)
µ 
 − 
¶
is obtained by combining market clearing and (5). Here it is assumed that consumers1
make forecasts of future output, inflation and nominal interest rates (     ) which2
are perceived as constants for all future periods, given that steady-state learning is3
considered. As agents do not know the interest rate rule of the monetary policy maker,4
they need to forecast future interest rates.5
2. The nonlinear Phillips curve6
 = −1[˜(    )] ≡ −1[(  )] ≡ Π(  )] (43)7
where () ≡ ( − 1) ˜() is defined in (4) and
(  ) ≡ 
µ
−1(1+) −
¡
1− −1¢ 
( − ¯)
¶
(44)
+


µ
(1− )−1
µ
−1( )(1+) −
¡
1− −1¢ 
( − ¯)
¶¶
is obtained from (4) under steady state learning and assuming  = ¯.8
It is noted that with Ricardian consumers the dynamics for assets do not influence the9
dynamics of inflation, output and the interest rate.10
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Proposition 3 Assume that −1∗ − 1  . Under the Wicksellian PLT rule (9), there1
exists a ZLB-constrained steady state in which ˆ = 1, ˆ = , and ˆ solves the equation2
ˆ = Π( (ˆ ˆ 1 1) ˆ) (45)3
Proof of Proposition 3: (a) Consider the interest rate rule (10). Imposing ˆ =4
  1 implies that  → 0 while ¯ → ∞ (or ¯ if ∗ = 1) as  → ∞. It follows that5
¯ − 1 + [( − ¯)¯] + [( − ∗)∗]  0 for  suﬃciently large when  → ˆ  ∗,6
so that  = 1 in the interest rate rule. A unique steady state satisfying (45) is obtained.7
Thus, ˆ, ˆ and ˆ constitute a ZLB-constrained steady state. ¥
8
It is remarked that the suﬃcient condition −1∗−1   is not restrictive as for a quar-9
terly calibration used below with  = 099 and ∗ = 1005 one has −1∗− 1 = −000505.4210
Proposition 3 states that, like IT with a Taylor rule, a commonly used formulation of price-11
level targeting suﬀers from global indeterminacy as the economy has two steady states under12
PLT monetary policy regime.43 It can be shown that under PLT the target steady state is13
locally determinate while the ZLB-constrained steady state is locally indeterminate.14
Proposition 4 (i) Assume   0 and  ≥ 0. Then the target steady state (∗ ∗ ¯) is15
locally determinate with PLT under opacity, i.e. any other REE in vicinity of (∗ ∗ ¯)16
does not remain forever in a neighborhood of (∗ ∗ ¯).17
(ii) The ZLB constrained steady state (ˆ ˆ 1) is locally indeterminate.4418
42For PLT a weaker suﬃcient condition is −1∗ − 1−  + (ˆ∗ − 1)  0, in which the term ˆ∗is
complicated function of all model parameters.
43As  → 0 in steady state (ˆ ˆ), Ambler and Lam (2016) call the low steady state “quasi equilibrium”
while acknowledging that this is a purely semantic issue.
44It is necessary to ensure that the ZLB continues to be binding after a shift to PLT. Using the Wicksellian
rule (10), assuming the usual calibration with  = 025 and  = 1 and setting  = , the approximate
constraint for ¯0 would be 0¯0 ≥ 50596. This is a very low value for ¯0 relative to 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Consider the Euler equations of the model.
( − 1) = 
(1+)
 −  − 1

( − )− + (
+1 − 1)+1
− = 
¡
(+1)−1(+1)−
¢ 
 = (∗)−1
 = ¯+ [( − ¯)¯] + [( − ∗)∗]
where = ¯ as usual. Next, loglinearize the equations at the target steady state. Using
the notation ˆ = log(− ∗), we get
∗(2∗ − 1)ˆ = (1 + )2 (
∗)(1+)ˆ −  − 1
∗
(∗ − )− [1− 
∗(∗ − )−1]ˆ
+∗(2∗ − 1)ˆ+1
−(∗)−ˆ = (∗)−(ˆ − ˆ+1)− (∗)−ˆ+1
ˆ = ˆ + ˆ−1
¯ˆ = ˆ + ˆ
Note that if ˜ =  − ¯ is absolute deviation then we have ˜ = ¯ˆ for log (or
percentage) deviation. Use notation ˆ+1 = ˆ+1 etc. for brevity and define  = ˆ−1. In
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matrix form we have
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 − 0 0
0 1 + (¯) (¯) 0
−1 0 1 −1
0 0 1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(46)
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ˆ+1
ˆ+1
ˆ+1
+1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

where
 = 1∗(2∗ − 1)
∙(1 + )
2 (
∗)(1+) −  − 1 
∗(∗ − )−[1− ∗(∗ − )−1]
¸

It is assumed that that   0 for which  ≥ 1 is a suﬃcient condition.1
Consider the forward looking system derived from (46) which is
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
 + ¯+

¯+ 0 −
¯
¯+
1
¯+

¯+ 0 −
¯
¯+
0 0 0 1
− − ¯+ −

¯+ 0
¯+¯+
¯+
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ˆ+1
ˆ+1
ˆ+1
+1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

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One eliminates the third equation which is definitional. The remaining 3× 3 matrix should1
then have two eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Determinacy at target steady state holds if2
  0 and  ≥ 0. Details are studied in a Mathematica routine available on request.3
(ii).  = 1 holds in a neighborhood of the ZLB constrained steady state. Locally the4
system becomes two-dimensional. Letting 0 = ((2 − 1)) we have the linearized5
system in matrix form:6
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 −0
0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
ˆ
ˆ
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
 0
−1 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
ˆ+1
ˆ+1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠  (47)
7
It can be shown that the eigenvalues of the system are real with one of them in the interval8
(0 1) and the other above 1. ¥
9
Part (i) of Proposition 4, i.e. the determinacy result suggests that in studying RE10
dynamics a first approach might focus on local dynamics due to random shocks near the11
target steady state. Naturally, such a study cannot consider the significance of the ZLB unless12
it is assumed that some appropriate and persistent shock has shifted the target steady state13
to the ZLB or its vicinity.45 In a general and rigorous analysis one should face the existence14
of multiple REE shown in Proposition 3. Part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows that locally there15
exist dynamic REE that converge to the ZLB-constrained steady state.16
The global nonlinear RE dynamics in the case of PLT is a diﬃcult open issue. We17
conjecture that these RE dynamics under PLT would be qualitatively similar to those under18
IT as the local determinacy results for steady states are the same for IT and PLT. It is19
45Following Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), this approach has much been used in the literature. For
example, see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011). The target REE in which ZLB holds is sometimes
called the fundamental liquidity trap.
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well-known that under IT, there are nonlinear perfect foresight paths that converge from1
near target (∗ ∗ ¯) to the “low” steady state (ˆ ˆ 1) or a limit cycle.46 We remark that2
the hypothesis of RE is extremely demanding in global nonlinear dynamics. In contrast, our3
approach starting from the assumption of imperfect knowledge and learning provides a much4
more tractable and realistic approach to study macro dynamics in the presence of a liquidity5
trap under diﬀerent versions of PLT.476
C2. Learning and Stability7
Now let us start to consider dynamics of the economy in these regimes under the hy-8
pothesis that agents form expectations of the future using adaptive learning. While bulk of9
the analysis of learning relies on numerical simulations, theoretical results for local stability10
or instability of the steady states are available for the learning process when the monetary11
policy regimes operates under opacity. We remark that in the IT regime, knowledge of the12
target inflation rate ∗ does not add to guidance in expectations formation as ∗ is a con-13
stant and forecasting the gap between actual  and ∗ is equivalent to forecasting future .14
In contrast, the PLT regime can include diﬀerent amounts of guidance.15
We begin with the IT regime. In our model expectations of output, inflation and the16
interest rate influence their behavior as is evident from equations (13) and (14). Then agents’17
expectations are given by equations (12) for variables  =   in accordance with steady-18
state learning. The local stability conditions under learning for the IT regime (7) are given19
46See Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001).
47See also Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2009), p. 930-931, for why adaptive learning is a more plausible
assumption than RE, particularly when agents are faced with policy changes (as is the case here since Sweden
somewhat unexpectedly switched to a diﬀerent policy regime in 1931).
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by the well-known Taylor principle for various versions of the model and formulations of1
learning.482
Expectational stability and instability results for the steady states for IT and PLT with-3
out guidance are now derived.4
C2.1. Stability Results for the IT Regime5
Under IT the temporary equilibrium system is (13), (14), and (7). In an abstract form6
 (   −1) = 0 (48)7
where the vector  contains the dynamic variables. The vector of state variables is  =8
(  ) . The learning rules (12) for variables  =   can be written in vector form9
as10
 = (1− )−1 + −1 (49)11
First consider local stability properties of steady states under the rule (7). Linearizing12
around a steady state we obtain the system13
 = (−)−1( +−1−1) ≡ +−1 (50)14
where for brevity the unchanged notation for the deviations from the steady state is used.15
Recall that  refers to the expected future values of  and not the current one. Combining16
(50) and (49) yields the system17
⎛
⎜⎜⎝


⎞
⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
 +  (1− )
 (1− )
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−1
−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠  (51)
18
48The seminal paper is Bullard and Mitra (2002). Recent summaries are given in Evans and Honkapohja
(2009a) and in Section 2.5 of Evans and Honkapohja (2013).
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The focus is in “small gain” results, i.e. stability obtains for all  suﬃciently close to zero.
1
Definition. The steady state is said to be expectationally stable or (locally) stable2
under learning if it is a locally stable fixed point of the system (50) and (49) for all3
0 ≤   ¯ for some ¯  0
4
Conditions for this can be directly obtained by analyzing (51) in a standard way as a system5
of linear diﬀerence equations. Alternatively, so-called expectational (E-stability) techniques6
based on an associated diﬀerential equation in virtual time can be applied, see for example7
Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Both methods are used in the proofs of the Propositions.8
The local stability conditions under learning for the target steady state in the IT regime9
(7) are given by the well-known Taylor principle:10
Proposition 5 In the limit  → 0 the targeted steady state is expectationally stable if  11
−1 under IT.12
By continuity of eigenvalues the result implies a corresponding condition for  suﬃciently13
small. In the text numerical simulations for other parameter configurations in the diﬀerent14
policy regimes are carried out. The learning dynamics converge locally to the targeted steady15
state for  and  for many cases with non-zero value of .16
Proof of Proposition 5: In the limit  → 0 the coeﬃcient matrices take the form
 = 0 and
 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝

−1 0 0
∗∗+(∗−¯)2
∗(¯−∗)(−1)
1
(1−)

(−1)
∗
(¯−∗)(−1)
1
(1−)

−1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

Price Level Targeting with Evolving Credibility 57
so that the system is forward-looking. The equation for  has the form
 =  − 1
 
which is E-stable and does not contribute to possible instability of the remaining 2×2 system
for which the coeﬃcient matrix ˜ denotes the bottom right corner of . It is easily verified
that the both eigenvalues of matrix ˜ −  have negative real parts. Its determinant is
(˜ − ) =  − 1
(1− ) 
so the determinant is positive if and only if   −1. Its trace is
(˜ − ) = 1 + ( − 2)
(1− ) 
 − 1
(1− )  0
The result follows. ¥1
For the low steady state there is instability:2
Proposition 6 The ZLB-constrained steady state is not expectationally stable under IT.3
Proof of Proposition 6: When the ZLB binds, the interest rate  is constant and 4
converges to this value independently of the other equations. Moreover, with  constant,5
 has no influence on  and . The temporary equilibrium system and learning dynamics6
then reduce to two variables  and  together with their expectations. Moreover, no lags7
of these variables are present, so that the abstract system (50) has only two state variables8
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 = ( ) and with  = 0 it can be made two dimensional. This is analyzed using usual1
E-stability method.2
It can be shown that
( − ) = − ˆ
(1+)(ˆ − ¯)1+(1 + ) + ˆ2( − 1)(¯ + ˆ( − 1))
(ˆ − ¯)( − 1)2(2 − 1) 
The denominator is positive whereas the numerator can be of either sign but is most probably3
positive ( ≥ 1 is suﬃcient). Thus, ( − )  0, which implies E-instability (in fact the4
steady state is saddle path stable as shown in Evans and Honkapohja (2010)). ¥5
For later purposes the learning dynamics under the ZLB-constraint (and assuming  =
 = 1) are illustrated using a phase diagram. The dynamics for IT and PLT under opacity
are clearly identical under the ZLB constraint and they are illustrated in Figure A.1 using
the calibration below. Formally, the dynamics are given by
∆ = ( (−1 −1 1 1)− −1)
∆ = (Π( (−1 −1 1 1) −1)− −1)
In Figure A.1 the vertical isocline comes from the equation ∆ = 0 and the downward-6
sloping curve is from equation ∆ = 0. It is seen that in the ZLB region, which is south-7
west part of the state space bound by the isoclines ∆ = 0 and ∆ = 0 (shown by the two8
curves in the figure), the dynamics imply a deflation trap, i.e. expectations of inflation and9
output slowly decline under unchanged policies.49
49Recall the constraint  =  = 0, so the most right-hand parts of the phase diagram may not be
relevant.
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FIGURE A.1 HERE
1
C2.2. Price-Level Targeting with Opacity2
To analyze learning dynamics under PLT the vector of state variables needs to augmented3
in view of the interest rate rule. Recall the variable  defined in which makes it possible4
to analyze also the situation where the actual price level is explosive. One also has (16) and5
the state variables are  = (  ) in system (48)-(49).6
Start with the local stability result for PLT when there is opacity. The system now7
consists of equations (14), (15), (10) and (16), together with the adjustment of output,8
inflation and interest rate expectations given by (13) for variables  =  . Theoretical9
learning stability conditions for the PLT regime are available in the limiting case  → 0 of10
small price adjustment costs.5011
Proposition 7 Assume  → 0 and that agents’ inflation forecast is given by (13) for  = .12
If   0 under the PLT rule (9), the targeted steady state  = ∗ ≥ 1 and  = −1∗ is13
expectationally stable.14
50Preston (2008) discusses local learnability of the targeted steady state with IH learning when the central
bank employs PLT. In the earlier literature Evans and Honkapohja (2006) and Evans and Honkapohja (2013)
consider E-stability of the targeted steady state under Euler equation learning for versions of PLT.
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Proof of Proposition 7: In the limit  → 0 for (50) the coeﬃcient matrices are
 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝

−1 0 0 0
∗(∗∗+(∗−¯)2)
∗(¯−∗)(−1)
∗
(1−)
∗
(−1) 0
∗
(¯−∗)(−1)
1
(1−)

−1 0
∗∗+(∗−¯)2
∗(¯−∗)(−1)
1
(1−)

(−1) 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,  =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −∗
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠

The equation for  is simply
 =  − 1
 
so that the movement of  under learning influences other variables but not vice versa. With1
learning rule (12) there is convergence to the steady state when  is suﬃciently small.2
The sub-system for  and  from (51) can be eliminated. Also eliminate the equation
for expectations of  since they do not appear in the system. This makes the system five-
dimensional. Computing the characteristic polynomial it can be seen that it two roots equal
to 0 and one root equal to 1 − . The roots of the remaining quadratic equation, written
symbolically as 2 + 1+ 0 = 0 are inside the unit circle provided that
0 = 1− |0|  0
1 = 1 + 0 − |1|  0
It can be computed that 0 = −∗[(−1)] and so 0  0 for suﬃciently small   0.3
For the second condition, it turns out that 1 = 0 when  = 0 and 1 = 1(1−),4
which is positive. ¥5
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Proposition 8 The ZLB-constrained steady state under the Wicksellian PLT rule (9) is not1
expectationally stable.2
This follows because under ZLB constraint the dynamics for IT and PLT without credi-3
bility are identical in view of the form of interest rate rules.4
D Further Issues5
This appendix contains various details pertaining to specific aspects of the numerical6
analysis.7
D1. Intuition for Robustness of PLT with Full Credibility8
The simulations below are formally specified in terms of the system incorporating equa-9
tion (52) below that describes the evolution of inflation expectations  (and not  ). The10
system for  is equivalent to that specified above using (17) and (19). This new system11
helps to understand the surprising result.12
Equation (52) is obtained by noting that the dynamics of  translate into dynamics of13
 taking the form14
 = −1(∗Π˜(−1 −1 −1 −1))(1− ) + ∗ (52)15
where Π˜(−1 −1 −1 −1) = Π( (−1 −1 −1 −1) −1) by (14). (52) results from16
combining (17) and (16) and assuming that 1 = 1.17
To interpret the dynamics in the ZLB region, first note that identity in (15) can be18
written as −1 = ∗, so that the price gap variable  decreases whenever inflation19
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is below the target value. In the region where ZLB is binding (and  =  = 1 imposed)1
the price gap ∗Π˜(−1 −1 1 1) = ∗−1 widens (i.e.  declines) and the gap term2
raises inflation expectations, ceteris paribus. The dynamics of  and  for the deflation3
region resulting from equations (52) and (12) for  =  and  =  = 1 are illustrated in4
Figure A.2 by means of a phase diagram. In the figure the vertical line is again obtained5
from equation ∆ = 0 and the downward-sloping curve from equation ∆ = 0. (Recall6
that derivation of (52) assumes that  and  are not zero, so that the intersection of the7
isoclines in Figure A.2 is undefined.)51
8
FIGURE A.2 HERE
9
Figure A.2 shows that guidance from PLT path leads to increasing inflation expectations10
in the constrained region defined by the intersections of area to the left of isocline ∆ = 011
and area below the isocline ∆ = 0. This adjustment eventually takes the economy out of12
the constrained region. Eventually the interest rate and its expectations also start to move13
away from the ZLB and there is convergence toward the targeted steady state.14
This eﬀect is absent from the dynamics for  under opacity, as inflation expectations15
then evolve according to (12). Recall Figure A.1 showing the deflation trap dynamics of 16
and  in the constrained region when agents do not incorporate the target price level path17
into their expectations formation. The contrast is very evident by comparing Figure A.2 to18
Figure A.1.19
51Recall again the constraint  =  = 1, so the most right-hand parts of the phase diagram may not be
relevant.
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D2. Details about Numerical Analyses1
D2.1. PLT under Opacity2
The calibration for a quarterly framework ∗ = 1005,  = 099,  = 07,  = 12821,3
 = 21,  =  = 1 and  = 02 is adopted and is discussed in section 4.2.. It is also assumed4
that interest rate expectations + = +−1+ revert to the steady state value −1 for5
 ≥  .52  = 28 is used. To facilitate the numerical analysis the lower bound on the6
interest rate  is sometimes set slightly above 1 at value 10001. The gain parameter is set7
at  = 0002, which is a low value. Sensitivity of this choice is discussed below.8
For policy parameters in the PLT regime adopt the values  = 025 and  = 1used9
by Williams (2010). For the IT rule (7) the policy parameter values are assumed to be the10
usual values  = 15 and  = 054.11
The targeted steady state is ∗ = 0943254, ∗ = 1005 and the low steady state is12
 = 0943026,  = 099. It should be noted that the steady state levels of output are13
numerically very close to each other. The closeness is a well-known challenge for nonlinear14
NK models.53 This issue is not a concern here as our objective is to describe how PLT can15
provide the endogenous mechanism for escaping from the liquidity trap and the qualitative16
results are not sensitive to the numerical calibration.17
It is said that convergence has been attained when mean actual inflation over the last18
ten quarters is within 1% annually around the target inflation rate (i.e. between 1002519
52The truncation is done to avoid the possibility of infinite consumption levels for some values of the
expectations. See Evans and Honkapohja (2010) for more details.
53Recent papers facing the issue include Mertens and Ravn (2014), Aruoba, Cuba-Borda and Schorfeide
(2018) and the references therein. Avoiding the criticism would require a more complex model, see for
example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017) who introduce downward rigidity of wages.
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and 10075) and similarly mean output over the last ten quarters is 002% around the target1
steady state (i.e. between 0943065 and 0943443 so that this interval excludes the low steady2
state); otherwise we say the dynamics does not converge.54 Figure 1 of the main text has3
the central results.4
D2.2. PLT with Full Credibility5
Note that Remark 1 (i.e. Proposition 3 in Online Appendix C1) continues to hold when6
agents use information about the target path under PLT regime.55 Output and interest7
rate expectations are assumed to be formed as before, see equations (12). The temporary8
equilibrium is then given by equations (16), (13), (14), (19) and the actual relative price 9
in (15). In this case learning fully incorporates knowledge of the price-level target path in10
their forecasting as described above in Section 5.11
D2.3. PLT with Evolving Credibility12
Auxiliary innovations ˜ , 1− ˜ are utility weighted so that13
 =[ ˜]˜ and  =[ ˜](1− ˜ ) (53)14
where the realized utility (with assumption  = 1) for period  is used, i.e.,15
˜ = ln[ − ¯]− 
1+

1 +  −

2
( − 1)2 (54)16
54For PLT we use the baseline gain while for IT we use a higher gain of 001 to speed up convergence.
55In the PLT case, equation (16) becomes 0 = 0 in the limit as   → 0, so that inflation expectations
are not defined by the equation. They are instead given by the steady state condition  = .
Price Level Targeting with Evolving Credibility 65
The Max operator with small   0 in (53) is used to keep utility positive.56 Note that1
if ˜  0 for some  and  = 0 then propensities  are not updated and in fact decline2
somewhat as   1. Intuitively, the propensities,  and   evolve as a function of the3
realized utilities obtained from the two forecasting schemes.4
Numerical specification for  can be found in game-theoretic literature where reinforce-5
ment learning models are fitted to data from a variety of experimental games. These es-6
timates vary a lot depending on type of experimental games used to obtain the data and7
the precise specification of reinforcement learning.57 The midpoint  = 085 of the range8
[08 09] is mostly employed, which seems reasonable given our simplified specification and9
the various estimates in the literature.10
Details for numerical results in Figure 3 and after are as follows. The gain parameter is11
set at 00008 in all the panels. Other initial conditions are as follows: 0 = 1−0 , 0 = 05,12
0 = 05, 0 = −1 = 0, 0 = 0, 0 = 0 = 10002 and 0 = 099. The convergence13
criteria continues to be the one described in the final paragraph of Online Appendix D2.1.
14
FIGURE A.3 ABOUT HERE
15
The results about domains of attraction in (0 0) -space are shown in Figure A.3. The16
top panel illustrates the case of high credibility where 0 = 09 and relatively high values of17
0 The domain of attraction for PLT with opacity is smaller than for PLT with even low18
56Standard models of reinforcement learning assume that payoﬀs in each period are positive, see e.g. Young
(2004), p.11. We have run many of the simulations without the non-negativity constraints and have found
that negative ˜ very seldom occur and in those cases the convergence properties are not aﬀected. See Online
Appendix D4. below.
57See Camerer and Ho (1999) for analysis and Chapter 6 of Camerer (2003) for an overview.
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credibility (for brevity these figures are not depicted).58 Computing the partial domain of1
attraction for IT for the same region of the state space, shown in the bottom panel of Figure2
A.3, yields a very significant message. With IT there is convergence to target equilibrium3
for all starting points in this part of the state space, so for this domain IT is a better policy4
than PLT even when credibility of the latter is very high. Thus IT is more robust than PLT5
when initial inflation expectations are at a high value.6
D3. Intuition for Dynamics with Limited Credibility7
The intuition is developed for the result stated in Section 6.2 that the economy can8
converge to the target steady state with even small amount of initial credibility. Consider an9
example where the economy starts from initial conditions a little bit above the low steady10
state. The basic parameters are set at usual values specified earlier. The initial conditions11
are 0 = 0 =  + 000005, 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 =  + 0001, 0 = 0 = 10001,12
0 = 0 = 1 and 0 = 0. The last equality means that the initial weight for forecasting13
with use of target price level has zero weight.14
If the dynamics starts with 0 and 0 a little bit above , there is an increase in  and15
an increase in   This is in part because for  = 1  increases in view of the relation16
−1 = ( ×∗) as the weight  becomes initially positive.59 There is also an increase17
in  but  remains initially unchanged before it begins to rise. The increase in actual18
58Computations for PLT show that higher credibility enhances the size of the domain of attraction but
even low credibility is beneficial. We have also looked at dynamics of IT and PLT with diﬀerent degrees of
initial credibility in terms of volatility of dynamics near the target steady state. For economy of space we
do not present these results which are available upon request.
59The early increase in  is due to setting the initial impulse ˜0 at 05. In addition, there is an increase
in  as 0 is slightly above . Setting ˜0 = 0 would lead a delay in the initial adjustments with no change
in the long run outcome.
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inflation  leads to an increase in  because for the latter actual data point  is higher1
than earlier value of 0. This is a crucial observation: the mechanism via an increase of 2
to an increase in inflation that is above the statistical forecast 0 raises the expectations3
 as well. This is in contrast to the dynamics when the agents solely rely on statistical4
forecasting (as then there is no  variable).5
These movements are illustrated in Figure A.4.60 The top panel of Figure A.4 shows,6
respectively, the movements of  and  for the first 10 periods. It is seen that 7
increases quite strongly while the rise in  is very gradual. The middle panel of Figure8
A.4 shows the movement of average inflation expectation  (computed from (22) with the9
weights  ) and the time path of  (for a long time period  = 120). It can be seen after10
the initial rise the weight  falls for over 40 periods as the forecast  is more accurate11
than  (the longer term movement of  is commented later).
12
FIGURE A.4 HERE
13
The slow monotonic increase in  persists while initially the movements of  are not14
monotonic, and initially this leads to fluctuating dynamics of the average inflation expecta-15
tions  and output expectations  . In the longer run the economy moves toward the target16
steady state. This is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure A.4 which show the paths17
of  and . In the longer run and after some fluctuations the weight  reaches level 118
and PLT becomes fully credible as shown in the middle panel of Figure A.4. As part of this19
process the economy enters the domain of attraction of PLT under opacity shown in Figure20
60To get a clear picture it is assumed in sections D3 and D4 that simulations do not have random shocks.
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1. In this region both  and  have tendency to converge. Both forecasting models1
are correctly specified in steady state equilibrium but forecasts based on guidance from PLT2
have smaller forecast errors as  = 1 for large .3
D4. Robustness Issues4
In this section some robustness exercises are considered with respect to the values of5
the gain parameters, in particular 1 for which there is no earlier analyses in the learning6
literature. Also we consider some variation for the value of  and comment on the question7
of non-negative utility in reinforcement learning.8
As a start the performance of combination forecasting near the targeted steady state9
is checked. Set  = 0002which corresponds to the value used in the main text. It turns10
out that the results are not sensitive to the value of the gain parameter 1. The weight 11
will eventually converge to 1, though in transition  = 0 for a significant period of time12
even after the economy has approximately converged to the targeted steady state up to high13
degree of numerical precision in terms of key macro variables , . However, the forecast14
error
¯¯ − −1¯¯ eventually becomes slightly smaller than ¯¯ − −1¯¯ causing the switch15
 → 1. Both ways of forecasting are asymptotically correctly specified and are doing a very16
good job very near the target steady state.17
These observations are robust to values 0  1 ≤ 1 of the second gain parameter. They18
are also robust to the initial weights of the two ways of forecasting. The qualitative results19
seem to be unaﬀected by the value of  with even values as low as  = 001 Note that20
realized utility is positive for all these replications i.e. utility is never negative which is what21
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reinforcement learning requires. For higher value  = 0005 similar results about convergence1
obtain.2
Next, the performance of combination forecasting near the low steady state is assessed3
while continuing to assume  = 085 If  = 0002, then there is convergence  → 1 for all4
values of 1 ∈ (0003 1] The transition again involves convergence to  = 0 in transition5
while the macro variables are converging to the target steady state. Eventually the system6
begins to converge to  = 1. The qualitative results seem to be unaﬀected by the value of7
 as  = 001 was tried too. Realized utility is (again) positive for all these replications.8
For  = 0005 there is convergence  → 1 when 1 ≥ 0007. When  = 001 the9
qualitative results seem to be unaﬀected when 1 ≥ 03. The realized utility maybe negative10
in some cases with the baseline utility function. To conform with reinforcement learning,11
we modify the utility function by adding a constant 15 (note that this does not aﬀect agent12
behavior). This makes realized utility positive in all cases.13
Robustness of the results with respect to a reformulation of the learning rule (19) when14
1  1 has also been analyzed. One could argue that agents update  using its previous15
forecast −1−1 and the most recent available data point −1. For  = 0002 the numerical16
results about convergence to the target steady state are unaﬀected by this change. But the17
outcome is sensitive to the value of . In the case of dynamics near the high steady state18
and a higher value  = 0005 there is convergence  → 1 when 1 equal 1 or 09, but19
convergence to  → 0 for 1 = 08  05 (for smaller values of 1 the system diverges.)20
For dynamics near the low steady state one gets that for higher value  = 0005 there is21
convergence  → 1 when 1 = 1 09 or 08. For values 1 ≤ 07 the system diverges.22
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Now examine further how much initial credibility is required for PLT and its guidance to1
achieve convergence of the economy to the target steady state in the long run. The economy2
has very low initial condition (−1 = 0 = 0 =  + 000005, 0 = 0 = 0 = 0 =3
 − 00001, 0 = 0 = 10001, 0 = 01, 0 = 0 − 00001) and shut oﬀ the PLT with4
guidance completely by setting initial conditions 0 = 0 = 0, setting  = 0 in (20) and5
˜ = 0 for all . This last condition means that private agents do not do any forecast6
combination and in particular ignore comparisons of forecast errors as in (21). In this case7
the economy diverges (with realized utility positive for all  even with no additive constant8
in utility function).9
If the initial conditions are modified so that there is either some initial credibility but10
no updating of the weight on  (0 = 0 and 0 = 05 but  = 0) or there is no initial11
credibility and very slow updating from the weight on  (0 = 0 0 = 0 and  = 0001),12
then the preceding divergence result is overturned. The economy converges to the target13
steady state. In the latter two examples any positive weight   0 comes purely or mostly14
as an impulse from the forecast comparison in a single period. (The preceding appendix15
discusses the intuition for this outcome.) Convergence takes place with the baseline gain16
 = 0002 and for all 1 ≥ 0003 (and even with  = 001). Realized utility is also positive17
in all cases. With the gain  = 0005 and for all 1 ≥ 03 with  = 001 (and also even18
smaller  = 0001) there is convergence too. Realized utility occasionally becomes negative19
but adding the constant of 15 in the utility function gives the same qualitative results.20
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E Further Details of the Swedish Case1
E1. Sweden in the 1930’s2
As background it is noted that the Swedish economy in the 1930’s was strongly influenced3
by the world-wide depression which started in the U.S.A. at the end of the 1920’s. The price4
level in countries with currency tied to the gold standard dropped sharply during the last5
two years of the 1920’s and the beginning of the 1930’s. Swedish consumer and wholesale6
prices followed this pattern in 1929, 1930, and in the first three quarters of 1931, see Figure7
1 in Berg and Jonung (1999) or the data sources mentioned below in Appendix E4.8
In the middle of September 1931, England left the gold standard due to speculation9
against the pound. The Riksbank and the Swedish government took the same step one week10
later (due to the huge outflow of foreign exchange reserves) and adopted a domestic paper11
standard. The Minister of Finance declared that the aim of Swedish monetary policy should12
be to preserve the domestic purchasing power of the krona using ‘all means available’. This13
statement became the core of the new program and the September 1931 price level was14
adopted as the starting point of the new regime.15
As regards the main policy instrument, the policy interest rate was raised from 4% to16
8% (at annualized rate) in September 1931 after which it was gradually brought down to17
(annualized) 2.5% by the end of 1933. After this the policy rate remained constant at 2.5%18
until December 1939.6119
61Most likely, the 1931 increase of the discount rate were made to reverse the outflow of forex reserves.
It can also be noted that in 1934-39 Sweden managed to have simultaneously constant policy interest rates
and exchange rates. The Swedish rate was 0.5% higher than the corresponding UK rate. Current account
surpluses and rising gold and forex reserves then made the autonomy possible.
Price Level Targeting with Evolving Credibility 72
The paper standard was short-lived as the Swedish krona was pegged to Pound Sterling1
in June-July 1933. As the Swedish experiment of PLT lasted a little bit less than two years,2
it can provide limited evidence about the performance of PLT but this is nevertheless a3
useful episode to consider being the only one of its kind! Swedish monetary policy from 19334
Q4 onward thus formally abandoned PLT.5
E2. Some statistical evidence relevant to section 7.2. (with Ioannis Karavias)6
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 contains some evidence the series produced7
by the model behaves similarly to the actual data. We now present further evidence in favor8
of this hypothesis by statistically testing the assumptions that the two series come from9
the same process. The standard approach in the literature for comparing simulated and10
real data is to statistically test whether moments from the data are equal to corresponding11
moments from the model, see e.g. Adam et al. (2016). This amounts to testing for, i.e.12
for first moments, the equality of means for two independent samples. The tests employed13
in the literature are typically based on assumptions such as independence of time-series14
observations and either normality or availability of large samples. Such assumptions are15
most likely invalid for our data. One assumption we must make, which is also common in16
the literature, is that of stationarity. Because the period of interest is short, the assumption17
of stationarity seems reasonable.6218
We want to test the assumption that the model observations and real data come from19
62We note that the model variables (prices, interest rates and output) are indeed stationary since the target
inflation rate is assumed to be one and government spending is a stationary AR(1) process. Moreover, Berg
and Jonung (1999) note that the price index in the data for the period 1928-38 exhibits a stable long-run
pattern (p.531) and, of course, interest rates may be assumed to be stationary.
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the same distribution. Because our sample is small, only eight observations (2 years), we are1
forced to use non-parametric hypothesis tests which have the advantage that they do not re-2
quire distributional assumptions like normality. However, these tests require the assumption3
of independent observations, and this might not be true.4
We proceed to statistically test for diﬀerences in prices and interest rates between model5
and real data in the following three steps63:6
Step 1: Testing for randomness in the individual series;7
Step 2: Modelling time-series dependence and removing it;8
Step 3: Testing for equality of distributions.
9
Step 1: The nature of time-series dependence is hard to specify since the theoretical10
model developed in this paper is nonlinear and may yield linear or nonlinear dependence in11
the generated observations. The first step is thus to test for such dependence. We employ the12
Swed and Eisenhart (1943) runs test for randomness in small samples. The null hypothesis13
is that the observations in a time series are independent. The table below provides p-values:
14
Observations Model Data
 006 011
 006 006
15
Because our sample is small we are inclined to use higher confidence levels, i.e. 10-20%,16
see e.g. Wooldridge (2012, p. 138; Guideline 2). The results indicate that there is dependence17
in both model generated and real data, of the price level and interest rate. The test does
63As mentioned, GDP data is available annually, so with only two observations, the GDP results are not
reliable and we do not report them here. Results for  and  are based on the benchmark model and data
presented in Figure 4 for the two years of PLT. Detailed results are available upon request.
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1
not discriminate between linear and nonlinear dependence.2
Step 2: We now model dependence in order to remove it. Given our small sample,3
we employ a parsimonious model, in particular, an autoregressive process of order one i.e.4
AR(1) process. After estimating the AR(1) model, we test the residuals for independence5
again using the runs test of Swed and Eisenhart (1943). The results are:
6
Residuals Model Data
 036 036
 043 036
7
The above table indicates that the AR(1) model has removed linear dependence in the8
price level and interest rate series of model and data. Because the null hypothesis of in-9
dependence of residuals is not rejected, we also assume that there is no further non-linear10
dependence in these series.
11
Step 3: We now proceed to test the null hypothesis of whether the distributions of residu-12
als are the same across the model and real observations. We employ the non-parametric inde-13
pendent sample Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon U test (Mann and Whitney (1947) and Wilcoxon14
(1945)). The p-values are presented below:
15
Residuals Independent sample U test
 056
 074
16
In the above scenarios we do not reject the null hypothesis that the model and residual17
distributions are the same. To summarize, the statistical analysis contains favourable evi-18
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dence that the price level and interest rate in the model and data follow the same process1
pointing to the direction of excellent model performance.2
E3. Further Details about Sensitivity Analysis3
We provide the further results of the sensitivity analysis mentioned in Section 7.2..4
Here are the results of RMSE’s for the calibrations of the model when the price adjustment5
cost parameter takes on the alternative values, i.e.  = 42 or 350.
6
 = 05  = 075  = 1  = 2
 = 05 1.01495 0.895844 0.939001 1.64058
  = 1 1.17116 1.07027 0.991479 1.01181
 = 2 1.53381 1.38586 1.27329 1.03712
 = 3 2.30238 2.11554 1.98719 1.57885
 = 05 0.0644713 0.0963066 0.1428 0.300146
  = 1 0.0676938 0.0670554 0.0806902 0.163591
 = 2 0.0898034 0.0895393 0.0873338 0.104555
 = 3 0.141071 0.132587 0.12705 0.111358
 = 05 1.6688 1.62173 1.58352 1.4627
  = 1 1.50789 1.4986 1.48944 1.44857
 = 2 1.34017 1.35565 1.36343 1.37397
 = 3 1.27394 1.28129 1.29008 1.3121
7
Table A.1: Root Mean Square Errors in price level  , normalized interest rate  and8
output  for the calibration  = 42
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1
 = 05  = 075  = 1  = 2
 = 05 1.93359 1.74982 1.58136 1.05959
  = 1 2.13241 2.02312 1.91858 1.55108
 = 2 2.27797 2.21528 2.14952 1.88797
 = 3 2.32164 2.25518 2.20535 1.99044
 = 05 0.151455 0.138481 0.12093 0.0596455
  = 1 0.158449 0.15338 0.147415 0.116105
 = 2 0.148158 0.147247 0.145052 0.135333
 = 3 0.12311 0.122869 0.123316 0.123723
 = 05 1.82972 1.80872 1.78392 1.68513
  = 1 1.55031 1.5455 1.54065 1.51757
 = 2 1.42315 1.42141 1.41917 1.41729
 = 3 1.36764 1.36714 1.36579 1.37396
2
Table A.2: Root Mean Square Errors in price level  , normalized interest rate  and3
output  for the calibration  = 350
4
Adopting the sum of RMSE of  and  as the criterion, we see that this sum for the5
calibrations  = 42 (and 128) are uniformly smaller than that with  = 350 (except for one6
parameter configuration) indicating superior matching with the data for  = 42 (and 128).7
Comparing  = 42 with  = 128 the benchmark value  = 128 seems somewhat better (in8
the sense that 11 of the 16 entries are smaller for the benchmark). Finally, we remark that9
the benchmark values for the preference parameters, namely  =  = 1 perform well with10
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the same criterion in the sense they are second-best with  = 42 and  = 128 ( =  = 21
turns out to be best in both cases). Next, time paths for price level and policy interest rate2
are reported for the diﬀerent calibrations (we do not show output for ease of presentation).
3
FIGURES A.5, A.6 AND A.7 ABOUT HERE
4
It is seen that the time paths are qualitatively similar for diﬀerent calibrations during the5
PLT period (they capture the fall in prices and interest rates during this period for all 6
values). The model dynamics in the post-PLT period are less well matched for  = 350 with7
the ZLB becoming a constraint for the interest rate under the Wicksellian rule (and similarly8
for  = 3 when  = 42 128).9
E4. Sources for Swedish Data10
For 1930s actual Swedish data for consumer prices (cost of living index), policy interest11
rate and aggregate output are shown in three panels of Figure 4 in the main paper.12
Data sources:13
(i) GDP, annual data: http://www.historia.se/VolumeIICh4GDP.xls14
(ii) industrial production: League of Nations Yearbooks, electronic version in15
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/otcgi/digilib/llscgi60-ae97.html16
(iii) cost of living index: Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics, http://www.scb.se/hitta-17
statistik/statistik-efter-amne/priser-och-konsumtion/konsumentprisindex/18
konsumentprisindex-kpi/pong/tabell-och-diagram/19
konsumentprisindex-kpi/kpi-historiska-tal-1830/20
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(iv) policy interest rates (discount rates):1
http://www.historia.se/VolumeIICh6Stocksandbonds.xls.2
(v) Gold and currency reserves: ”International Currency Experience”, League of Nations,3
Geneva 1944.4
E5. The 1920’s Experience in Sweden5
The episode of Sweden in 1920’s when it rejoined the gold standard provides a case about6
setting the initial target price level in inflationary circumstances even if the case is not about7
PLT. For this reason we use the episode below in Appendix F.8
The outbreak of World War I, which saw also the collapse of the gold standard system,9
gave rise to large fluctuations in the Swedish price level and the Swedish money stock:10
between 1914-20, the price level increased by 165% and the money stock by 195% (see Figure11
1 in Jonung (1979)). This was followed by a period of “policy of deflation” (Wetterberg 2009,12
p. 272.) as the Swedish government decided to return to the gold standard at prewar parity.13
This meant that the target price level was much lower than the current level. The process14
was gradual with initial tightening of policy in 1920 while the gold standard was reintroduced15
de facto in 1922 and de jure in 1924.16
The decision to go back to prewar parity was in line with the thinking of Knut Wicksell,17
the original proponent of price level stabilization and PLT. Wicksell had proposed a return18
to the price level of 1914 and a stabilization of prices at this level even if the return to gold19
standard was inconsistent with independent domestic control of the money stock.20
The macroeconomic consequences of the 1920 decision were not favorable, see Figure 121
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of Jonung (1979). The Swedish money stock was reduced by 29% between 1920 and 1925,1
and the price level fell by 35% during the same period. At the same time the international2
economy plunged into a deep depression which had an additional negative impact on Sweden.3
During these years unemployment reached the highest level ever recorded in Sweden.4
It may be noted that another very prominent Swedish economist Eli Heckscher held the5
view that Swedish krona should be tied to gold at the existing rate of exchange but his6
advice was not followed. Soon after the Swedish monetary policy decisions Bank of Finland7
requested a report from Heckscher about the possible return of the Finnish markka to gold8
standard. In 1922-23 Heckscher recommended that the return of the markka to gold standard9
should be based on prevailing market exchange rate, See Kuustera and Tarkka (2011), pp.10
463-466.11
F Significance of the Initial Target Price Level12
F1. Dynamics and volatility of adjustment13
The Swedish episode in the 1930’s can shed light to the issue of setting the initial level of14
the target price which can be important in assessing performance of PLT. The 1930’s episode15
corresponds to setting 0 = 1 (recall 0 = 0¯0) and the economy was characterized by16
a generally deflationary scenario in the run up to the adoption of PLT. Our earlier results17
(see Figures 2 and 3) suggest that PLT is a good policy during these circumstances. It can18
also be shown that a relatively low value for 0 is advantageous when the economy is close19
to the low steady state.20
Dynamics of the economy that result from the move to PLT are a further consideration for21
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assessing performance of PLT. Both the level of ¯ (0) and the current state of the economy1
at the time of the change have an impact on fluctuations in the adjustment path. For2
properties of dynamics the Swedish experience in the 1920’s is also worth considering as a3
case of an initial boom situation even though the policy change was not an introduction of4
PLT regime.645
Two sets of initial conditions of the economy are considered. Sweden was in the grip of a6
recession and deflation in 1931 Q3, Figure A.8 and Table A.3 are constructed by calibrating7
the economy roughly to the data of 1931 Q3.65 On the other hand, the early 1920’s price8
stabilization took place when the economy was in a boom like scenario: Figure A.9 and9
Table A.4 are constructed by calibrating the economy roughly to the data of 1920.10
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient in the AR(1) government spending process is assumed to11
be 07 We simulate the economy for 100 replications of the sequence of random shocks to12
government spending that are taken from a normal distribution with zero mean and standard13
deviation of 00005. The aim is to approximate the initial conditions in Sweden just before14
the introduction of price level stabilization in September 1931 in Figure A.8 and Table A.3;15
so we use an inflation target of zero. Agents are assumed to use recursive least squares16
learning in these simulations. The formal details of least squares learning procedure are17
outlined in Online Appendix B3.. The gain parameter is our baseline value of 00026618
Initial conditions for the other endogenous variables were chosen in the following fashion:19
64Price level stabilization policy in the 1920 episode took place in a situation of rising prices. The intention
to go back to pre-WWI parity for the Krona exchange rate did not lead to good outcomes. See Online
Appendix E5. for more detail on Swedish performance in the 1920’s.
65Figures A.8 and A.9 show inflation and output as deviations from the steady state value of one for
inflation and 100 for output.
66The reinforcement learning dynamics apply to cases of positive utility; so we add a small positive constant
of 5 to utility to keep it always positive. Of course, this does not aﬀect the choices of agents in our model.
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Interest rates were somewhat rising just before September 1931 after an earlier fall; so we1
set 0 = 101 and 0 = 1009 which are close to each other with the former slightly larger.2
Concerning output and output expectations, they are set close to the low steady state:3
0 =  + 00001 and 0 =  + 000012 where  = 0943028 in the model. This is pure4
guess work, but the idea is that in 1931 the recession in Sweden was close to the liquidity5
trap. 0  0 is assumed as the economy was declining just before 1931 Q3. For similar6
reasons 0 = 099999 and 0 = 0 = 09995 Initial credibility was set at a low value7
0 = 01.8
The initial values for PLM parameters were set as follows: 0 = 0, 0 = 0, 0 = 0,9
0 = 0, 0 = 0, 0 = 0, 0 = 1, 0 = 0. The moment matrix R0 in LS regressions10
was set at the asymptotic value.11
Table A.3 and Figure A.8 report respectively the median volatilities and median dynamics12
over these 100 replications. We first describe the volatility results.13
Volatility in inflation, output and interest rate during the learning adjustment is com-14
puted in terms of median unconditional variances of inflation, output and interest rate (called15
() () and () in the tables below). The value of a quadratic loss function (called16
 in the table) in terms of the weights 05 for output, 01 for the interest rate and 1 for17
the inflation rate (the weights are taken from Williams (2010)) and also the median ex post18
utility of the representative consumer (called ) are calculated.19
0 takes the values indicated in the tables. Table A.3 gives the volatility results for
inflation, output and interest rates dynamics in the first three columns. The next two
Price Level Targeting with Evolving Credibility 82
columns show the loss () and ex-post intertemporal utility ()
X
=0 
˜
where ˜ is given by (54) and  = 300. The sixth column () shows the frequency1
of the interest rate  to hit the ZLB (defined as a situation when   1001) and the2
final column () reports the frequency of entering deflation (defined as a situation when3
  1). In these final two columns the percentage of times in all simulations when the ZLB4
or deflation is encountered is reported.
5
Case (i): initial inflation and output expectations are in a recessionary state6
at approximately the levels prevalent in Sweden in September 1931.7
() () ()    
0 = 095 0.952606 0.890523 4.41801 1.83967 402.944 1.26578 46.7475
0 = 1 2.81912 1.74867 9.23454 4.61691 402.919 4.41528 50.907
0 = 105 6.37008 4.05788 12.2337 9.62239 402.87 6.62458 51.4385
8
Table A.3: Volatility of inflation, output and interest rate for PLT with diﬀerent values of9
0. Note: the numbers for () (), () and  should be multiplied by 10−6.
10
It is seen that 0 = 095 is better than 0 = 1 which in turn is better than 0 = 10511
in terms of all the criteria presented in Table A.3: inflation, output, interest rate volatility,12
loss, utility, ZLB and Def criteria.13
We next consider the dynamic implications of the choice for 0. Figure A.8 shows the14
median dynamics of inflation, output and the interest rate from the simulations used for15
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Table A.3 to replicate the 1930’s scenario. It is seen that the low value 0 = 095 results in1
faster recovery from the recessionary current state of the economy. This is in line with the2
idea that in a recessionary situation a relatively high value of the initial target price ¯0 can3
contribute to recovery by maintaining a less restrictive monetary policy.
4
FIGURE A.8 ABOUT HERE
5
The next case is designed to capture the boom scenario in 1920. Here the aim is to6
use approximately the initial conditions in Sweden in 1920 when the process to rejoin the7
gold standard was started as monetary policy was significantly tightened. The parameter8
settings are mostly as in Table A.3 (with the inflation target continuing to be zero) except9
that the initial conditions for real variables were as follows: 0 = 1016, 0 = 101725,10
0 = ∗ + 00001,  = ∗, 0 = 0 = 10015 = 0. Here ∗ = 0943177 and also11
0 = 101.12
Table A.4 and Figure A.9 give the results for this boom like scenario. The big policy13
move in 1920 corresponds to 0  1 in an inflationary situation. We report the results for14
three diﬀerent values of 0 namely 09 11 and 135 (the latter value seems to approximate15
the Swedish scenario the best during this time).16
Case (ii): initial conditions approximate those in Sweden in the 1920s to17
capture a boom like scenario.6718
67Low values of 0 = 08 lead to divergence so we plot using 0 = 09
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() () ()    
0 = 090 38.4655 26.8357 114.17 63.3004 402.39 3.71096 49.1395
0 = 110 11.419 7.86199 78.4759 23.2696 402.816 0.15615 51.103
0 = 135 29.7195 26.2798 70.8947 49.9489 402.481 1.58472 52.1296
1
Table A.4: Volatility of inflation, output and interest rate for PLT with diﬀerent values of2
0. Note: the numbers for () (), () and  should be multiplied by 10−6.
3
FIGURE A.9 ABOUT HERE
4
The outcome is less clear cut but in a boom there seems to be a lot of initial volatility5
when 0  1. The latter outcome is broadly in line with the 1920’s Swedish experience.6
Volatilities for inflation and output are higher when a relatively high initial value for the7
target price level is set: compare values for 0 = 135 with 0 = 11 in Table A.4; loss is8
higher and utility is lower too with 0 = 135. This result is also visible in Figure A.9 for9
the initial periods of the dynamic paths. Notably there is a much sharper recession with10
0 = 135 compared to 0 = 11 with output staying below targeted steady state for 1611
periods and inflation below the steady state (i.e. in the deflationary zone) for 28 periods.12
Incidentally, note that there is an initial recession episode when 0 = 11 and 135 which is13
avoided when 0 = 09 (lower interest rates when 0 = 09 spur an initial rise in output14
and inflation).15
F2. Domain of Attraction Computations16
Figures A.10.1-2 show the partial domains of attraction in (0  0) space for PLT with17
guidance for two diﬀerent values of the initial target price level ¯0 (with other initial condi-18
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tions set close to the low steady state). The analysis is presented in terms of 0 The initial1
target price level ¯0 is set such that 0 = 095 and 0 = 105 in the two cases. The numer-2
ical results indicate that a relatively high value of ¯0 (i.e. a low value of 0) is conducive3
to convergence to the target steady state when the economy is initially near the low steady4
state. In economic terms the results state that when introducing a PLT regime the initial5
value for the target price level path should be made relatively high, so that monetary policy6
is kept loose for longer.
7
FIGURES A.10.1-3 ABOUT HERE
8
Similar exercise has been done in the (0  0) space though here the results are roughly9
similar when 0 = 095 and 0 = 105 However, with higher credibility lower inflation10
expectations yield convergence to target with both 0 = 095 and 0 = 105. (Details are11
available upon request.)12
One also considers a situation when expectations of inflation, output and interest rate are13
above the targeted steady state to capture a boom-like scenario. Figure A.10.3 depicts the14
domain of attraction in such a situation when 0 = 095. Here 0 = 1015 0 = 102 0 =15
0 0 = 0 + 000001 and 0 = 0. Also set 0 = 0 + 00001 and 0 = 0 − 0000116
as in Figures A.10.1-2. As before, with higher credibility, higher output expectations are17
conducive to convergence to target. With 0 = 105 a similar figure obtains.
18
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Figure A.1: Dynamics of inflation and output expectations in the constrained region when
there is no guidance.
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Figure A.2: Dynamics of inflation and output expectations in the constrained region with
guidance from PLT.
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Figure A.3: The top panel shows the domain of attraction for PLT with high credibility
(0 = 09) and the bottom panel shows the domain for IT. 0 is plotted along the
horizontal axis (in deviation from target steady state output) and 0 is plotted along the
vertical axis. Note that 0∗  102 are not stable with PLT whereas even 0∗ = 106
are stable with IT.
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Figure A.4: Inflation forecasts  (denoted piexpC in figure) and  (piexpN) with and
without guidance from PLT in top panel. The middle panel shows average inflation
expectations  (piexp) and the weight  (qC) of forecast based guidance. The bottom
panel shows the (convergent) dynamics of inflation and output (in deviation from target
steady state output).
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Figure A.5: Dynamic median paths for  and  for diﬀerent values of elasticities,  and 
in the Swedish scenario with  = 128. Green color depicts the model paths for  = 05
yellow for  = 075 red for  = 1 and magenta for  = 2 while the thick, solid line depicts
the actual evolution of  and  from Swedish data. Period 1 denotes September 1931 and
the dynamic evolution is shown for the subsequent 7 years.
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Figure A.6: Dynamic median paths for  and  for diﬀerent values of elasticities,  and 
in the Swedish scenario with  = 42. Green color depicts the model paths for  = 05
yellow for  = 075 red for  = 1 and magenta for  = 2 while the thick, solid line depicts
the actual evolution of  and  from Swedish data. Period 1 denotes September 1931 and
the dynamic evolution is shown for the subsequent 7 years.
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Figure A.7: Dynamic median paths for  and  for diﬀerent values of elasticities,  and 
in the Swedish scenario with  = 350. Green color depicts the model paths for  = 05
yellow for  = 075 red for  = 1 and magenta for  = 2 while the thick, solid line depicts
the actual evolution of  and  from Swedish data. Period 1 denotes September 1931 and
the dynamic evolution is shown for the subsequent 7 years.
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Figure A.8: Inflation, output, interest and relative price median dynamics under PLT for
diﬀerent values of 0 with initial conditions capturing Swedish data in September 1931.
Plots for 0 = 095 in dotted lines, 0 = 1 dashed (red) lines and 0 = 105 solid lines
(here target steady state output is normalized to 100 in top right panel).
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Figure A.9: PLT dynamics for diﬀerent values of 0 with initial conditions capturing
Swedish data in 1920s (axes are the same as in Figure A.8). Plots for 0 = 09 in dotted
line, 0 = 11 solid line and 0 = 135 dashed red line (0 = 135 corresponds to prevailing
relative price in Sweden).
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Figure A.10.1: Domain of attraction for 0 = 095 with initial conditions close to low
steady state. Credibility along horizontal axis and output expectations (in deviation from
target steady state) along vertical axis.
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Figure A.10.2: Domain of attraction for 0 = 105 with initial conditions close to low
steady state. Axes same as in Figure A.10.1.
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Figure A.10.3: Domain of attraction for 0 = 095 in boom like scenario. Axes same as in
Figure A.10.1.
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